The Private Turn in Development Finance. by Van Waeyenberge, Elisa
 
 
1 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800 
 
 
 
 FESSUD	  FINANCIALISATION,	  ECONOMY,	  SOCIETY	  AND	  SUSTAINABLE	  DEVELOPMENT	  
 
 Working	  Paper	  Series	  No	  140	  
 
The private turn in development finance 
D6.06 
Elisa Van Waeyenberge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800 
 
 
 
The private turn in development finance 
Elisa Van Waeyenberge 
 
SOAS University of London 
 
Abstract The	  last	  few	  decades	  have	  seen	  dramatic	  changes	  in	  development	  finance.	  These	  have	  been	  accompanied	  by	  a	  redefinition	  of	  the	  purpose	  of	  development	  cooperation.	  A	  strong	  belief	  in	  the	  potential	  of	  private	  flows	  to	  finance	  development	  has	  come	  to	  prevail	  and	  public	  or	  official	  flows	  have	  become	  increasingly	  deployed	  in	  support	  of	  private	  flows	  as	  the	  newly	  projected	  main	  source	  of	  development	  finance.	  This	  has	  specific	  implications	  regarding	  aid	  instruments,	  in	  particular	  through	  ‘blending’	  and	  the	  attempt	  to	  rely	  increasingly	  on	  public-­‐private	  partnerships.	  As	  aid	  and	  development	  cooperation	  become	  deployed	  increasingly	  to	  mobilize	  private	  finance,	  the	  core	  role	  of	  public	  finance	  for	  public	  goods	  is	  downplayed.	  This	  trend	  has	  accelerated	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  GFC	  with	  its	  specific	  implications	  for	  fiscal	  space	  to	  support	  ODA	  in	  developed	  economies.	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1. Introduction 
 
The last two decades have seen dramatic changes in trends of various forms of finance 
flowing to developing countries. Developed countries’ aid flows fell during the 1990s, after 
having reached a peak at the start of the decade. As aid fell during the 1990s, private flows 
grew rapidly and, from 2003, picked up at an exponential rate, after having collapsed at the 
turn of the century in response to a series of international financial crises. Private flows 
suffered another dent as the global financial crisis erupted but recovered very quickly soon 
after that (from 2010 onwards). As such, the last decade has witnessed the fast integration 
of some developing countries (or emerging and developing countries) in international 
financial markets as private capital flows to (and from) EDEs have surged, except for the 
temporary blip due to the Lehman collapse. Further, while official flows accounted for over 
half of total net long-term flows to developing countries at the start of the 1990s, this fell to 
an average of just over a third in the years preceding the current global crisis (2005-2007), 
despite the renewed increase in ODA from the early 2000s onwards. Since, they stand at 
approximately just under 40 percent of total net flows to developing countries.  
 
The GFC has had negative implications for the willingness of Northern donors to finance 
development assistance. This is evident in their lackluster performance in terms of 
ODA/GNI ratios. The latter has been on a declining trend since 2010 and stands at an 
average of 0.29 percent of GNI in 2014. This remains far away from the committed target of 
0.7 percent and below shares observed in the early 1990s. The limited fiscal capacity (and 
political willingness) to fund official development assistance of Northern donors is likely to 
persist for the coming years, as Northern countries frequently invoke budgetary constraints 
at home and changes in the global financial landscape. 
 
Accompanying these trends there has been a redefinition of the purpose of Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) and development cooperation more broadly. This has been 
driven by the weakening of Northern donors’ commitment to the public financing of 
development. A strong belief and commitment to the potential of private flows has come to 
prevail. The fast expansion of private flows since the early 2000s has indeed often been the 
result of specific policies enacted by Northern donor countries (or financial institutions) – in 
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particular capital account opening and liberalisation of domestic financial systems. And 
when Northern aid picked up again in the early part of the 2000s, this reinvigoration was 
characterised by a distinct understanding of the role of aid: in support of private flows as the 
main source of development finance. This had specific implications pertaining to the 
increasing prominence of new instruments of aid, in particular through various “blending” 
mechanisms, including the widespread promotion of public-private partnerships (PPPs). As 
ODA becomes increasingly deployed to mobilize private finance for development, the core 
role of public finance for public goods is downplayed. These trends has been accelerated 
through the implications of the GFC for fiscal space to support ODA in developed 
economies.  
 
This working paper explores in detail how the official financing for development discourse 
has become centrally organised around a main focus on the private sector as both purpose 
and source of “development” finance. It proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
genealogy of the private turn. It first teases out the discursive shifts implied by the private 
turn. It proceeds to explore the private turn in practice and gives an example of the private 
turn in action. The section also documents the particular model of development cooperation 
that is implied through the private turn with its emphasis on synergies across concessional 
and non-concessional flows and highlights the sectors that have benefited most strongly 
from the private turn. Section 3 documents the specific way in which the private turn has 
been promoted for the European context. Section 4 discusses the European Blending 
Facilities that have been created since 2007 in an attempt to increase the catalytic effect of 
aid for the mobilisation of other non-concessional and private flows for financing 
development. Section 5 proposes a critical appraisal of the increased deployment of public 
resources for the promotion of private participation in development as implied in the private 
turn. Section 6 concludes this part of the Report.  
 
2. The private turn in development finance: A genealogy 
 
Discourse 
 
The trends described in Part I of this Report have been accompanied by a changing 
conceptualisation of development cooperation. Indeed, during the last two decades, we 
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have seen the ascent in the official (Northern) development community of a firm belief in, 
and strong commitment to, the potential of private flows to finance development. Private 
flows are now projected as a superior substitute for aid flows, which had traditionally been 
considered as the more suitable form through which to engage in development finance.i 
The European Report on Development (ODI 2015, p. 80) highlights that:  
 
“While the earlier models on finance needs assumed that ODA would fill any gaps in 
reaching the MDGs, various recent modelling studies have moved on from the reliance on 
ODA and provide evidence of the potential of better managed and increased domestic tax 
revenues as well as private capital flows to contribute to the achievement of the MDGs and 
their post-2015 successors, the SDGs.”  
 
The fast expansion of private financial flows to developing countries has been promoted 
through various donor-promoted measures (encompassed in aid packages or trade and 
investment treaties), including capital account liberalisation and regulatory changes in the 
service of more foreign investor-friendly domestic environments.ii This has combined with a 
reorientation of Official Development Assistance (ODA) now understood as key in 
leveraging private finance for major investments needed for development (such as e.g. in 
social and economic infrastructure). Increasingly, mechanisms such as public-private 
partnerships are to be instrumental in pooling resources for these investments. This 
redefinition of ODA’s role has culminated in various contributions around the post-2015 
development financing framework, including through the Third Financing for Development 
(FFD3) summit and various statements by major actors in international development (World 
Bank and IMF 2015; World Bank 2013; G20 2013; United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development 2014b; 
ODI and UNDP 2014). 
 
The shift, which we refer to as “the private turn” in development cooperation and finance, 
has been evident in official discourse on development finance from the late 1990s onwards. 
It has, however, become increasingly visible through the outcome documents of the 
successive United Nations Financing for Development summits, leading to the Third 
International Conference for Financing Development that took place at Addis Ababa 
(Ethiopia) in July 2015.  At the first UN Summit on Financing Development in Monterrey in 
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2002,iii the principle that financing for development was increasingly to be provided through 
international capital markets became officially adopted by the international community. The 
idea was that for developing countries to overcome high levels of poverty, they should put 
in place transparent, stable and predictable investment climates with the aim of attracting 
private international capital flows. This required special attention to property rights and 
business-friendly macroeconomic policies and institutions. A residual and auxiliary role for 
aid emerged as part and parcel of the rapid expansion of private financial flows, with an 
emphasis on its role in “capacity” or “institution” building, promoting an enabling 
environment for private investment, both domestic and foreign.  
 
These ideas were reiterated at the Doha Review Conference on Financing for Development 
in 2008.iv In the midst of the unfolding global financial and economic crisis, the Doha 
Declaration insisted that there was a persistent need (paragraph 23):  
 
to strengthen national, bilateral and multilateral efforts to assist developing countries 
in overcoming the structural or other constraints which currently limit their 
attractiveness as a destination for private capital and FDI … Such efforts could 
include the provision of technical, financial and other forms of assistance; the 
promotion and strengthening of partnership, including public-private partnerships and 
cooperation arrangements at all levels.  
 
The text continued (paragraph 24):  
 
The programmes, mechanisms and instruments at the disposal of multilateral 
development agencies and bilateral donors can be used for encouraging business 
investment, including by contributing to mitigating some risks faced by private 
investors … ODA and other mechanisms, such as, inter alia, guarantees and public-
private partnership, can play a catalytic role in mobilising private flows.  
 
The emphasis was on an “enabling domestic and international investment climate”, with 
particular attention for contract enforcement and respect of property rights (paragraph 25). 
Special mention was made of the need to improve support for private foreign investment in 
infrastructure development. In sum, greater opportunities for ODA to leverage private 
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resources were to be sought (paragraph 47): “the interplay of development assistance with 
private investment, trade and new development actors provides new opportunities for aid to 
leverage private resource flows”. Further, “capacity development” and technical cooperation 
were understood as important ways to enhance developing countries’ prospects to achieve 
development objectives (paragraph 53), with technical cooperation in such areas as 
governance, institution building and promotion of best practice acquiring specific 
importance. 
 
At the World Bank, a core participant (or perhaps leader) in the development community, 
the shift to embrace private financing for development was reflected in the adoption of the 
2002 Private Sector Development Strategy as the corporate blueprint for the institution. The 
strategy had two broad objectives: to extend the reach of markets through investment 
climate reform with a special focus on measures that help micro, small and medium 
enterprises and to improve access to basic infrastructure and social services through 
private participation. The Bank’s 2007 Long Term Strategic Framework (World Bank 2007) 
reaffirmed these priorities as the two pillars (investment climate and empowerment pillars) 
for its framework for thinking about development. Development was redefined as private 
sector development. At the operational level, the broad claim of the World Bank strategy 
was to shift performance risks from domestic taxpayers in developing countries to private 
parties, where these were deemed better able to manage risk.v  
 
For the Bank, as the environment within which it was operating was changing rapidly with 
the rise of international private finance, its institutional set-up and programmes needed to 
reflect that change. The private sector became projected as the main pillar of development 
and the role of the public sector evolved accordingly now to focus on “unlocking the kinetic 
energy of the private sector” (World Bank and IMF 2012, p. 1). The World Bank Group 
became reconstituted to demonstrate its recognition of the central role of the private sector 
in the following ways. First, it increased its levels of support for an “enabling” environment 
for investment and private sector activity, both through lending and through technical 
assistance and knowledge services. IBRD/IDA yearly loan commitments aimed at enabling 
investment, strengthening capital markets, building infrastructure for private sector services, 
and strengthening the foundations for private sector activity increased and came to 
represent between 30 and 47 of all World Bank (IBRD/IDA) lending, depending on the year 
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(World Bank and IMF 2012, p. 2). And more than a third of Bank analytical and advisory 
work now supports a critical aspect of private sector development (including investment 
climate, market reforms or property rights).  Second, the Bank group, including through the 
activities of its private sector affiliate, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and its 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), commits greater volumes of support 
directly to the private sector.vi Third, the World Bank Group increasingly mobilises efforts 
through joint initiatives across its different affiliates (public and private sector) in an attempt 
“to leverage the comparative advantages” of its different branches. The World Bank Group 
continuously seeks to enhance the synergies across its different affiliates through specific 
initiatives. This includes specific initiatives to raise the volume of PPP financing, of which 
the Global Infrastructure Facility is a recent manifestation (see also below).vii  
 
In brief, the World Bank Group has come to see nearly all of its areas of engagement as a 
way to facilitate private sector development (see also its Modernization Agenda):viii  
 
“Increasingly, the arms of the World Bank Group that finance, advise and insure the private 
sector directly – IFC and MIGA – are working on shared programs and projects with World 
Bank units that focus on support to governments through public policies, regulations and 
underlying investments to catalyze private sector activity. This collaboration ranges from a 
joint World Bank and IFC division to joint-financing of investments, particularly in low 
income countries, to team collaboration in the provision of advisory services” (World Bank 
and IMF 2012, p. 2).  
 
The following diagram sums up the way in which the World Bank Group understands its 
various roles (through its various affiliates) to leverage and support the private sector:ix  
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Source: World Bank and IMF (2012)x  
 
In general, the private turn in development cooperation has sought to promote synergies 
between concessional and non-concessional development cooperation across various 
donors (bilateral and multilateral). This new model of development cooperation proceeds 
through the use of “blended finance instruments”, the use of aid to “leverage” other financial 
flows, or emphasizes the “catalytic” effect of aid in the mobilization of non-aid official and 
private financial flows.xi The idea is to increase resources available to developing countries 
by mobilizing finance and investments from the private sector instead of increasing public 
resources.xii “Blending” or “leveraging” captures the specific way in which official 
development cooperation can be used directly to catalyse private flows. Through blending, 
the grant element can be used in a strategic way to attract additional financing for important 
investments in developing countries by reducing exposure to risk (see Martin 2015). 
Leveraging can involve a host of different “partners” (including multinationals, commercial 
banks, etc.) and can take different forms (PPP promotion, guarantee instruments, equity 
stakes, etc.). As highlighted by UKAN (2015, p. 7) and illustrated above, while the principles 
behind leveraging have been around for some time,xiii there has been a sharp increase in 
interest in the donor community recently. For Eurodad (2013, p. 8):  
 
“blending could be seen as part of a potential sea change for development finance, which 
effectively shifts ODA from the public to the private sector, while at the same time helping to 
replace ODA with private finance”. 
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Recently, in the run up to the Third Financing for Development Summit that took place in 
Addis Ababa in July 2015, the Development Committee of the World Bank and the IMF 
explicitly argued for a transformation of development finance post-2015 which puts 
“blending” or “leveraging” at its heart (World Bank and IMF 2015).xiv  For the institutions, a 
“paradigmatic shift” on how development will be financed is required to unlock the 
resources needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGS), which are to 
succeed the Millennium Development Goals. For this purpose “the world needs intelligent 
development finance that goes well beyond filling financing gaps and that can be used 
strategically to unlock, leverage and catalyze private flows and domestic resources” (World 
Bank and IMF 2015, p. 3).  
 
The private sector is given a “pivotal” role in financing the post-2015 development agenda 
(p. 12 paragraph 34). It is recognized that private sector firms seek investment opportunities 
on the basis of risk-return considerations, so public sector measures that seek to 
encourage private investment will need to decrease perceived risk or increase anticipated 
returns (paragraph 35). Multilateral institutions like the World Bank can provide support in 
various ways. This includes improving the investment climate, for which multilateral 
institutions can act “as technical advisers and honest brokers between commercial interests 
and policymakers” (paragraph 39). Multilateral development institutions can also build 
platforms to connect private sector corporations and financial institutions with policymakers 
and official agencies “to identify and put in place … the most important policies”. Further, 
drawing on the Multilateral Development Banks’ preferred creditor status, private investors 
assisted by these institutions can obtain funding sources on more advantageous conditions 
(World Bank 2013, p. 25). In sum, multilateral institutions aspire to play a crucial role in 
identifying areas of market failure “or areas where markets are yet non-existent” and “to 
structure commercially viable projects in these areas” (paragraph 40). Or, as stated in 
World Bank and IMF (2015):  
 
“Multilateral Development Banks work to provide the necessary incentives (political comfort, 
appropriate pricing structure, regulatory advice, advisory funds, risk sharing, co-investment, 
etc) to address risk-return requirements of the private sector while encouraging inclusion 
and high standards”.  
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This model of development cooperation was fully endorsed trough the FFD3 summit which 
put blended finance and various forms of public private partnerships to deliver blended 
finance at the heart of its outcome document. Paragraph 48 of the final outcome document 
strongly reflects this emphasis:xv  
 
“We recognise that both public and private investment have key roles to play in 
infrastructure financing, including through development banks, development finance 
institutions and tools and mechanisms such as public-private partnerships, blended finance 
which combines concessional public finance with non-concessional private finance and 
expertise from the public and private sector, special-purpose vehicles, non-recourse project 
financing, risk mitigation instruments and pooled funding structures. Blended finance 
instruments including public-private partnerships serve to lower investment-specific risks 
and incentivize additional private sector finance across key development sectors led by 
regional, national and subnational government policies and priorities for sustainable 
development. For harnessing the potential of blended finance instruments for sustainable 
development, careful consideration should be given to the appropriate structure and use of 
blended finance instruments. Projects involving blended finance, including public-private 
partnerships, should share risks and rewards failure, include clear accountability 
mechanisms and meet social and environmental standards. We will therefore build capacity 
to enter into public-private partnerships, including with regard to planning, contract 
negotiation, management, accounting and budgeting for contingent liabilities. We also 
commit to holding inclusive, open and transparent discussion when developing and 
adopting guidelines and documentation for the use of public-private partnerships, and to 
build a knowledge base and share lessons learned through regional and global forums”. 
 
As we move forward from the Millennium Development Goals towards a new set of 
Sustainable Development Goals, SDG 17 further puts “global partnerships” at the heart of 
sustainable development.xvi More specifically, while the SDG17 calls for greater efforts of 
domestic resource mobilization together with greater efforts on behalf of donors in 
delivering on the 0.7 percent target for ODA/GNI, it enshrines the principle that “additional 
financial resources” should be mobilized from “multiple sources” (SDG17.3). It calls 
explicitly to “[e]ncourage and promote effective public, public-private and civil society 
partnerships, building on the experience and resourcing strategies of partnerships” 
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(SDG17.17), a call that has been much denounced by various civil society organisations 
given the poor evidence record bearing on PPPs (see further below). In essence, with the 
projection of ODA budgets as under pressures, due to the persistent fiscal ramifications of 
the GFC, and ODA falling short of providing the resources necessary to address the next 
set of development goals, the SDGs as successors of the MDGs, the (Northern) donor 
community seeks to consolidate an approach that increasingly uses what are projected to 
be limited ODA resources as leverage for private capital in financing development in 
developing countries.  
  
These trends have also characterized the discourse on development effectiveness, which 
has been projected through a set of conferences, including Rome (2003), Paris (2005), 
Accra (2008) and most recently Busan in 2011.xvii  While the successive declarations on 
development effectiveness have emphasized the importance of developing country 
ownership for effective aid outcomes, the Busan outcome document explicitly sought to 
highlight a role for the private sector in development effectiveness. This included: the 
promotion of an “enabling” environment for private investment, including through increased 
foreign direct investment and public private partnerships; the enablement of the private 
sector to participate in the design and implementation of development policies to foster 
sustainable growth and poverty reduction; the development of innovative financial 
mechanisms to mobilize private finance “for shared development goals”; the promotion of 
“aid for trade” and mechanisms that mitigate risks faced by the private sector; exploring the 
scope for further complementarities between public and private sector participants.xviii   
 
The private turn in practice 
 
Leveraging draws on specific instruments. The main instruments though which ODA can 
leverage private investment are summed up in Table 1 below:  
 
Table 1: Main instruments to leverage private investments with ODA 
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8
LEVERAGING AID
What are the most common forms of ´leveraging’?
Using ODA to leverage private sector investments generally involves the use of ODA 
grants (including technical assistance) in combination with other sources of finance 
to create a leverage effect and attract additional capital. Table 3 below summarises 
the main instruments used to leverage finance using ODA according to the European 
Commission (2009) and indicates whether they are commonly used by donors. 
What is additionality and why is it important?
In the context of this literature review, additionality can be broadly defined as the 
unique inputs and services that the use of ODA funds provides in addition to those 
delivered by market or nonmarket institutions (based on IEG, 2008). Thus, additionality 
represents the added value of using ODA compared to other sources of finance, 
in particular those available in the market. Unless donors can prove ODA funds are 
necessary to a) make to the project happen and/or b) increase the development 
impact of projects, then they are simply displacing other actors who could provide 
finance and subsidising private sector investments, which would result in a 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis other companies. Without additionality and an ability 
to demonstrate that additionality, aid is potentially being wasted.
Mechanism Description Use
Interest rate 
subsidies
Grant is used to cover part of the interest 
payments. The project promoter thus 
receives a subsidised loan below market 
interest rate
Frequent
Loan guarantees Grant is used to cover the losses of the 
lender in case of default, so that it agrees 
to finance the project or to do so in better 
conditions
Frequent
Technical Assistance Grant is used to provide specialised 
assistance during project preparation or 
implementation
Frequent
Structured finance – 
first loss piece
Donors offer finance with a lower 
repayment priority than the debt issued 
by other financiers. In case of default, 
donors would absorb the losses first 
Less frequent, 
used by specialised 
DFIs mainly
Equity investment A direct capital contribution is made to a 
company of investment funds, usually in 
order to send a signal to other investors 
or cover for first-losses and attract 
additional capital
Less frequent
Table 3 Main instruments to leverage private investments with ODA
 
Source: UKAN (2015, p. 8) 
 
More broadly, the support from the OECD donor commun ty for the privat  sector has taken 
both direct and indirect forms. Indirect support to the private sector happens through policy 
and regulatory advice (for an “enabling environment”),xix capacity building, public finance 
interventions, while direct support to private sector happens through project preparation 
(“building a pipeline of bankable projects”), financing, credit enha cement, output-based aid 
(OBA)xx arrangements, guarantees, risk mitigation, and various other (see Table 1).xxi  
 
The private turn in aid has had specific implications for trends in development cooperation 
(see also Di Bella et al. (2013); Actionaid, Eurodad, and Oxfam 2014). With the increased 
celebration of the private sector for the mobilisation of resources for development, there has 
been a growing interest in Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) and IFIs (or their 
affiliates) with private-sector oriented activities (see Annex 1 for a list of International 
Finance Institutions with private sector operations). DFIs are publicly owned institutions 
“that lend money, either at commercial rates or on concessional terms, to public or private 
sector borrowers in developing countries” (Eurodad 2013, p. 7).xxii  The activities of DFIs do 
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not traditionally count towards ODA as they fail the concessionality threshold and as they 
often directly lend to (or take positions in) private sector companies. Kingombe, Massa, and 
te Velde (2011, p. 1) clarify the purpose of DFIs as follows: xxiii   
 
“In general terms, DFIs provide finance (e.g. loans, guarantees, equity positions) to the 
public sector (most parts of the multilateral development financial institutions (such as the 
MDBs), e.g. the African Development Bank (AfDB)) or the private sector (e.g. International 
Finance Corporation (IFC); CDC; DEG (German Investment Corporation); most of the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)). The shareholders (donor 
countries, e.g. the UK represented by DFID or, in some cases, the private sector) provide 
callable capital/endowments to DFIs, which they use to provide loans and equity positions. 
These can leverage in other sources of finance, including private finance”.  
 
In the context of fostering private participation (including in infrastructure) in developing 
countries, DFIs (and IFIs with private-sector oriented activities) seek to mitigate risks of 
private-led investments. In particular, DFIs/IFIs seek “to compensate for the lack of financial 
resources and remove investment bottlenecks through advisory services (e.g. project 
preparation facilities), and co-financing (e.g. equity and debt) and risk mitigation finance 
(e.g. guarantees)” (OECD 2015, p. 25).  
 
Figure 1: Private sector commitments by International Financial Institutions, 1991-2010 (see 
Annex 1 for acronyms). 
 
36 International Finance Institutions and Development Through the Private Sector
Ov rview
Commitment Volumes
Annual IFI financial commitments to the pri-
vate sector have grown significantly in recent 
years, reaching over $40 billion per year in 
2010 from about $10 billion in 2002 (see 
figure 24). As a result of th  rapid growth, 
private finance is a much more prominent 
component of overall development finance 
than it was 10 years ago.34 
A number of the IFIs, particularly the multilateral 
development banks, also have mobilization 
programs, where other financial institutions par-
ticipate in IFI projects, ei her through traditional 
loan syndications, or through newer instruments 
such as equity participations (for example, the 
IFC Asset Management Company, Proparco 
Amundi AFD mutual fund, or the China-IIC SME 
equity fund), or through special initiatives that 
pool donor and other funds into IFI projects. 
While there are some differences in definitions, 
overall mobilization of this type ppears o add 
over $14 billion, or more than 25 percent, to the 
commitment numbers shown in figure 24.
Figure 25 shows the IFI commitments by 
region and by sector. Overall, the commit-
ments are broad based, with some concen-
tration in Europe and in financial markets 
(including funds, which are about 10 percent 
of the financial markets total, and including 
SME finance through financial intermediaries). 
Most of the finance is long-term debt, with 
about 15 percent equity and about 15 percent 
trade finance.
Development Outcome or Transition 
Succes  Rates
A number of IFIs have developed systems 
that track development outcomes or transi-
tion outcomes for private sector projects. 
Measurements of success are typically based 
on such items as financial returns, returns to 
the whole economy, environmental and social 
34 See World Bank,, Global Monitoring Report 2010 (Washington, DC: World Bank,), for public and private finance numbers 
from multilateral institutions.
Figure 24. IFI Private Sector Commitments to Developing Countries, 1991–2010
Source: IFI Database, largely from annual reports. Data are for private sector operations, without sovereign guarantees or grants. Does not 
include political risk insurance. Data is for calendar year except for IFC where data is for fiscal year ending June of subsequent year. 2010 
data is preliminary. It is estimated that over 90 percent of IFI private sector finance is covered in this database.
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Source: IFC (2011, p. 36) 
 
Kingombe et al. (2011) highlight that the there has been a sharp increase in the 
commitments of DFIs’ annual financial commitments, as indicated in Figure 1 above. While 
these accounted for only 5 percent of capital flows to developing countries around 2010, 
they were higher for certain regions (reaching nearly 11 percent of capital flows to SSA) 
and various OECD governments and multilateral institutions have indicated their ambition to 
transform these institutions into major actors in the world of development finance 
(Kingombe et al. 2011). Further, IFC (2011, p. 21) points out that nearly one-fifth (18 
percent) of all long-term syndicated loans to developing countries (with a maturity in excess 
of 1 year) include an IFI as a participant. This draws on the core role of private-sector 
oriented IFI which is to draw in private sector finance. The IFC (2011, p. 30) clarifies that 
partnerships with private investors has always been a central part of these institutions 
involvement, with participation in a project often limited to below 50 percent and the rest 
provided by commercial banks, equity investors, etc. 
 
 
The next figure shows that there has been some regional variation in the fast increase of 
activities of private-sector oriented IFIs, with commitments to the private sector standing out 
for the region of Europe and Central Asia. Figure 2 below also indicates that the private turn 
has favoured two sectors, namely finance and infrastructure.  
 
 
Figure 2: IFI commitments to the private sector by region and sector, 2007-09 
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37International Finance Institutions and Development Through the Private Sector
outcomes, and private sector development. 
Multilateral development banks have agreed 
on good practice standards for evaluating 
private sector investments. While implementa-
tion of these standards differs too much to 
make data from these banks directly com-
parable, results generally show that 60–85 
percent of mature projects exceed targeted 
benchmarks,35 a good outcome, given the 
inherent risk of private sector activity. Projects 
that have both high development impact and 
sustainable financial returns for the IFIs show 
that positive development outcome and IFI 
financial outcome tend to go together.36 A 
number of IFIs also now track additionality in 
their measurement systems.
IFIs have used their development measure-
ment systems to provide feedback to continu-
ously improve performance: results inform 
strategy, operations, and incentives and help 
identify strengths and areas for improve-
ment. For example, one IFI used metrics to 
identify weakness in environmental and social 
success rates in a region and responded by 
strengthening supervision (including more 
site visits and more environmental staff in the 
region), leading to improved results. Another 
IFI identified higher development success 
rates in its key areas of focus. IFIs are also 
taking measures to integrate lessons from 
experience into the design of new operations, 
including systematically reviewing lessons 
from similar projects, and have facilitated an 
inter-IFI exchange of lessons learned from 
evaluations of various operations.
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Source: IFC (2011, p. 37)  
 
These data indica e that apart from implying a new model of deve opment cooperation 
which seeks to exploit synergies between aid and non-aid flows across various official 
development cooperation institutions or arrangements, the private turn in official 
development cooperation has favoured two sectors: financial markets and infrastructure. 
Indeed, the argument in favour of leveraging or “blending” has been particularly popular in 
the context of infrastructur  finan ing, for which the pr otion of PPPs has witnessed a 
strong revival over the last few years.xxiv  This corresponds to the mass of wealth, in the 
hands of various insti uti nal investors, seeking the stable and inflation-linked yields that 
PPP investments potentially offer (see OECD 2014a).  
 
The next section documents the way in which European development cooperation has 
ridden the wave of the private turn. But before we proceed we provide an example of the 
private turn in action. 
 
The Dakar-Diamniadio Highway, SENAC, Eiffage and “blending” 
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In August 2013 a new toll road was inaugurated in Senegal providing a 25 km link between 
Dakar and Diamniadio, to the west of the capital city. The road connects Dakar to its new 
Blaise Diagne international airport and also affects transport between Dakar and Thies, 
Senegal’s second most populous city. It was the first greenfield road PPP in SSA (outside 
of South Africa) as well as the first toll road in Senegal and West Africa more broadly. It 
presents an important flagship project for the country, region as well as the entire sub-
Saharan African continent as it introduces a new way of providing road transport. The PPP 
is operated as a concession that was awarded for 25 years to the special purpose company 
Société Senegalaise de l’Amiante Ciment (SENAC) S.A. SENAC is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of the French multinational corporation (MNC) Eiffage, which is a leading 
construction and toll road operation company. The concession was awarded to SENAC 
S.A. for the design, building, “financing” and operation of the toll road for the length of the 
contract. As the Senegalese government was developing its plan for the road, a grant was 
provided to the Government of Senegal by the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
(PPIAF), which is a World Bank-coordinated donor platform that seeks to promote PPPs 
across the developing world. The grant was formally awarded to engage in stakeholder 
consultations. The feasibility study produced as a result of these constulations indicated 
that an investment subsidy of the Government of Senegal to the prospective private 
provider of the toll road would be necessary to attract private interest. In return, the 
concessionaire would pledge to keep the tolls at “relatively low levels” (World Bank Group 
2015).  
 
A financing package was put together by a set of international (and national) development 
cooperation agencies. The Agence Francaise du Developpement (AFD) and the African 
Development Bank each provided a concessional sovereign loan to the Government of 
Senegal which would enable the Government of Senegal to finance the subsidy to SENAC, 
which the original feasibility study had identified as necessary to attract private interest. 
These concessional sovereign loans were supplemented by non-sovereign loans (on non-
concessional terms) by publicly backed international financial institutions directly to SENAC. 
Finally, SENAC brought in some equity and a commercial provided a loan to SENAC .  
 
Table 2 below gives an idea of the share of publicly-backed concessional and non-
concessional resources that was deployed to make a private investment possible in the 
 
 
18 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800 
construction and operation, if not financing, of the toll road (access to which obviously is 
regulated by capacity to pay). Official development partners provided a total of US$176 
million and the Government of Senegal supplemented this with another US$ 54 million of 
public resources. The private sector contributed US$ 48 million (of which US$ 40 in equity 
and US$8 through debt) to the total financing of the road construction costs. So while the 
idea of leveraging originally is about deploying small amounts of publicly-backed resources 
to leverage large amounts of private finance, the opposite seems to have taken place here! 
Large publicly backed resources have been leveraged by a small amount of private finance 
and this has enabled a privately-operated road to collect tolls from road-users in Senegal, 
with the toll-operator owned by a French MNC.  
 
Table 2: Distribution of Road Construction Costs, Dakar-Diamniadio Toll Road 
 
 47 
92. A co-ordinated approach to support Senegal in carrying out the project preparation contributed to 
bringing together a financing package for the PPP project. The feasibility studies were funded by the GoS 
and WBG, which helped the government to realise that an investment subsidy was needed to attract 
potential private sponsors. Thus, official development partners, notably AFD and AfDB, provided 
sovereign concessional loans to the GoS to finance this subsidy. The IFC was the lead arranger of private 
debt financing from the private arms of AfDB and WADB, which helped mobilise equity finance from a 
consortium of companies led by Eiffage, a French construction company. CBAO, a private, Senegalese 
bank, was crowded-in last by providing a commercial loan.  
Table C : Distr ibution of Project Preparation Costs 
Institution  Type 
Amount (USD 
million) 
Government of Senegal N/A N/A 
PPIAF Grant 0.25 
World Bank (Project Preparation 
Fund) Grant 1.25 
World Bank - IDA (Private Investment 
Promotion Project) 
Concessional 
Loan N/A 
 
Table D: Distr ibution of the Road Construction Costs 
Institution  Nature 
Amount      
 (USD 
million)  
Share of 
total 
a. Government of Senegal Government Budget 54 19% 
b. Official Development partners   176 64% 
  Sovereign Loans 105 38% 
AFD Concessional Loan 37 13% 
AfDB (African Development Fund) Concessional Loan 67 24% 
  Non-Sovereign Loans 72 26% 
World Bank - IFC Non-concessional Loan 27 10% 
AfDB (Private Arm) Non-concessional Loan 16 6% 
West African Development Bank Non-concessional Loan 29 10% 
c. Private Sector Equity and Non-sovereign Loan 48 17% 
Concessionaire (SENAC) Equtiy 40 14% 
CBAO Group Attijariwafa Bank Non-concessional Loan 8 3% 
Total Construction Costs of PPP   278 100% 
 
93. In terms of determining how financing was leveraged from the private sector, one might say that 
the non-sovereign lending by the development partners of 26% was able to leverage the 17% from the 
private sector (ratio of 1:0.7). However, one could also say that the sovereign loans by the AFD and AfDB 
of 38% were crucial in getting the private sector involved; thus the sovereign and non-sovereign lending of 
64% was able to leverage the 17% of private investment (ratio of 1: 0.3).  Either way, the amount 
leveraged from the private sector did not surpass the amounts provided by the official development 
partners.  
 
Source: OECD (2015, p. 47).  
 
A compl x web of in eractions eme ged between private nd public a d publicly backed 
institutions to enable th  Dakar-Diamniadio toll road PPP, w ich is to operat  as flagship 
project for the broader region. This has included the indirect extension of concessional 
loans to PPP’s special purpose vehicle (which nevertheless remain on the government 
books) together with the direct extension of publicly backed non-concessional loans to the 
special purpose vehicle operating the toll road (OECD 2015). We consider further below in 
section 5 the implications of the promotion of private sector involvement in infrastructure 
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provisioning. We, however, first take a closer look in the next two sections at the way in 
which the private turn has affected European development cooperation.  
 
3. Europe and the private turn 
 
Collectively, the EU and its 28 member states are the world’s largest aid donor. However, 
there has been less focus on the EU in critical commentary on development assistance, as 
compared, for instance, to an institution like the World Bank. This is probably due to the 
disparate or fragmented nature of development cooperation emerging from the EU. Let us 
give a brief overview of what the EU development cooperation landscape looks like (see 
Laskarides 2015 for an extensive account).  
 
EU ODA is disbursed through the bilateral aid budgets of individual members as well as 
through the EU institutions. In 2012, EU institutions and member states collectively spent € 
55.2 billion in ODA, with approximately one fifth of this under management by EU 
institutions. At the level of the European Union, aid comes from two sources: the general 
community budget (financed by member states’ contributions to the budget and own 
resources of the European Community)xxv and the European Development Fund (EDF). 
The latter is financed by direct contributions from member states.xxvi  ODA is disbursed 
through a set of instruments (see Laskarides 2015) and these are implemented mainly by 
EuropeAid, which is the Community’s external cooperation office created in 2001 and which 
was merged into DG Development and Cooperation (DEVCO) in 2012.  
 
The European Commission plays the dual role of multilateral/bilateral donor and the 
coordinating body between member states. Through a set of initiatives, the European 
Commission has sought to increase streamlining of communal and member states’ 
development polices (European Union Centre of North Carolina 2012). In general the EU 
seeks to improve coordination between the EU and member states, increasingly through 
joint programming of aid. It also seeks to make increased use of new funding sources, 
including blending facilities and private sector funds (European Commission 2014a). 
Mirroring the private turn described above, various statements on development by the 
EC/EU, from the 2000s onwards, increasingly started to point to the imperative of exploring 
synergies between ODA and other (non-concessional) flows to developing countries. This 
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has had implications for the relationship across institutions, in particular the relationship 
between the agencies traditionally involved in ODA (DEVCO/Europeaid) and the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) and national DFIs of member states. 
 
DFIs in Europe, including the EIB, have increasingly been drawn upon for synergies of aid 
management, as private sector development became a principal focus of European 
development assistance (in line with the private turn more broadly across the OECD donor 
community and other IFIs). Under the framework of the Cotonou Agreement, for instance, 
an Investment Facility was set up (in 2003), which placed some of the EDF (i.e ODA) funds 
under EIB management with a mandate to support private sector development in ACP 
states “by financing essentially – but not exclusively- private investment” (European 
Commission 2013b).xxvii   The Investment Facility seeks to provide support for the private 
sector, in particular SMEs through support for the local savings’ market but also seeks to 
facilitate foreign direct investment.xxviii  The Facility provides support through debt finance, 
guarantees, equity-type financing and acts as an investor in private equity funds.xxix 
 
The European Consensus on Development endorsed by member states in December 2005 
sought to establish formally a framework to coordinate aid policies across member states 
and the EU institutions.xxx It presented the first European document “to contain a shared 
vision of principles, values and objectives, as well as political aspirations on which the 
European development aid could be based” (Zemanová 2012, p. 41).  The Consensus 
sought to renew the commitment to increasing ODA, reaffirmed the principles of ownership 
in development cooperation etc. It also called for the strengthening of synergies between 
programmes supported by the European Investment Bank and other DFIs and those 
financed by the Community. Specifically, paragraph 119 of the Consensus asserted that: 
“The EIB is playing an increasingly important role in the implementation of Community aid, 
through investment in private and public enterprises in developing countries”. The Agenda 
for Change endorsed in 2011 (European Commission 2011) further pursued this emphasis 
wishing to increase the use of blending of loans and grants (mixing EU grants with loans or 
risk-sharing and guarantee mechanisms) arguing that this would generate substantial 
financial leverage of EU aid resources to support public and private investments in 
developing countries.  Officially, blending mechanisms are projected as a response to the 
need to increase the volume of development financing while resources are constrained (“to 
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do more with less”); they allegedly allow for more speedy aid disbursement as well as 
would allow for greater flexibility to adapt to changing environments (Bilal and Kratke 
2013).xxxi  For Gavas (2010):  
 
“Blending offers the prospect of EU grant funding being freed up with possible reallocation 
to the neediest countries. The theory suggests that an effective and efficient blending 
instrument should involve lower grant shares in countries with higher incomes (other things 
being equal)”.   
 
Indeed, the increased occurrence of blending aims to respond to the Commission’s 
“differentiation” approach, which seeks to act on the increased heterogeneity across 
developing countries (see Eurodad 2013). Through this approach, the Commission would 
concentrate its ODA in Low Income Countries (LICs), while leveraging other flows to Middle 
Income Countries (MICs) through various blending mechanisms. Blending approaches are 
however practiced across the spectrum of developing countries (see also below).xxxii   
 
A 2012 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council 
of Minsters (European Commission 2012) reaffirmed the crucial role of the private sector in 
development financing, which needs to be mobilised through innovative ways of funding 
development: “The EU should use its grants more strategically and effectively for leveraging 
public and private sector resources”.  This led to the launch in December 2012 of an EU 
Platform for Blending in External Cooperation with the explicit objective of improving the 
quality and efficiency of EU external cooperation blending mechanisms.xxxiii  “This includes 
promoting cooperation and coordination between the EU, EIB and other relevant financial 
institutions (FIs) and other stakeholders, thereby increasing the impact and visibility of EU 
external cooperation”. 
 
The Agenda for Change was followed by “A Decent Life for All” (European Commission 
2014a), which outlined an EU vision for a post-2015 development framework. Again the 
Communication emphasised that the private sector remains the key driver of inclusive and 
sustainable growth. And governments are urged to make full use of the opportunities 
provided by the private sector, both at domestic and international level. Also, the “catalytic” 
potential of ODA is to be better exploited through such mechanisms as blending. The 2013 
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Communication Beyond 2015 (European Commission 2013a) focused on how the post-
2015 framework is to be financed and offers (yet) another example of a proposal for a 
future financing framework that “reinforces the linkages between public and private finance, 
and domestic and international resources” (Griffiths et al. 2014, p. 4). For the European 
Commission (2013a, p. 8):  
 
“Innovative modalities of delivering finance can increase effectiveness and should be 
scaled up. Blending of grants with loans and equity, as well as guarantee and risk-sharing 
mechanisms can catalyse private and public investments, and the EU is actively pursuing 
this.”  
 
And while the text continues to concede that private finance is fundamentally different from 
public finance, and that private interests do not “per se” pursue public policy goals, “a small 
shift in private investment priorities and modalities could bring about significant benefits to 
public policy goals”. These shifts, for European Commission (2013a), can be achieved 
primarily through domestic and international policy incentives, such as those offered by 
public-private partnerships.  
 
The European Commission communication “A Stronger Role of the Private Sector in 
Achieving Inclusive and Sustainable Growth in Developing Countries” (EC 2014 /263) 
published in May 2014 set out further how to operationalise a vision of development that 
puts the private sector at its centre. The Communication indicated how the Commission 
works closely with developing country governments to support them in developing and 
implementing policies to support private sector development. This includes the deployment 
of grant funding in support of a range of activities such as regulatory reform, capacity-
building, and the provision of business development services (with a projected focus on 
strengthening local MSMEs). The Communication also highlighted that the Commission is 
actively seeking for new ways to harness the potential of the private sector as a: 
 
 “financing partner, implementing agent, advisor or intermediary to achieve more effective 
and efficient delivery of EU support, not only in the field of local private sector development, 
but also in other areas of EU development cooperation such as sustainable energy, 
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sustainable agriculture and agribusiness, digital and physical infrastructure, and the green 
and social sectors” (European Commission 2014b, p.3).  
 
The strategic framework guiding EU development cooperation sees the private sector not 
solely as a partner but also seeks to assist the private sector in achieving “positive 
development results as part of its core business strategies”. EU programmes should be 
delivered as much as possible through market-based approaches, which create business 
opportunities for local (and foreign) entrepreneurs (with a special role for cash transfers in 
the context of social programmes as these allow for market development by supporting 
demand) (p. 4).  
 
The Commission has specified a set of criteria that should be deployed when supporting 
private sector actors and these are summed up in the Box below.  
 
Box 1: Criteria for supporting private sector actors 
!
!
5 
!
" Put strong emphasis on results. Support for private sector development and partnerships 
must be accompanied at all levels by efforts to strengthen results measurement and 
assessment of the development impact of interventions. 
" Observe policy coherence in areas affecting the private sector in partner countries. 
Besides ensuring that EU policy action does not adversely affect the development 
prospects of partner countries, close coordination between relevant Commission services, 
as well as with EU Member States, will remain a priority to ensure a comprehensive EU 
approach and make development and other relevant EU policies coherent and mutually 
reinforcing. The 2012 Commission Communication on Trade, Growth and Investment5 
articulates approaches that illustrate how this is being implemented in relation to trade and 
investment policies. 
Box 1: Criteria for supporting private sector actors 
(1) Measurable development impact: Support given to a private enterprise or financial 
intermediary has to contribute in a cost-effective way to the achievement of development goals 
such as job creation, green and inclusive growth or broader poverty reduction. This requires 
transparency as regards objectives and results, along with appropriate monitoring, evaluation 
and results measurement arrangements. 
(2) Additionality: Without public support the private enterprise would not undertake the action or 
investment, or would not do so on the same scale, at the same time, in the same location or to 
the same standard. The supported action should not crowd out the private sector or replace 
other private financing. 
(3) Neutrality: The support given should not distort the market and should be awarded through an 
open, transparent and fair system. It should be temporary in nature with a clearly defined exit 
strategy. Support justified by market failures and consequent risks should not have the effect of 
discouraging regulatory reform efforts addressing the causes of market failure. 
(4) Shared interest and co-financing: Partnerships with the private sector have to be based on 
cost-effectiveness, shared interest and mutual accountability for results. The risks, costs and 
rewards of a joint project have to be shared fairly. 
(5) Demonstration effect: A supported action should aim to have a clear demonstration effect that 
catalyses market development by crowding in other private sector actors for the replication and 
scaling-up of development results. 
(6) Adherence to social, environmental and fiscal standards: Private enterprises receiving 
support have to demonstrate that their operations are compliant with environmental, social and 
fiscal standards, including respect for human and indigenous rights, decent work, good 
corporate governance and sector-specific norms. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 COM(2012)22 final. 
 
Source: European Commission (2014b)  
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The Communication (European Commission 2014b) further indicates that the private sector 
development mission is all-encompassing, applying to most areas of EU support, including 
in agriculture and agribusiness, sustainable energy, infrastructure and social sectors, and is 
also prominent in the areas of environment, climate change, migration, risk management, 
raw materials, natural resources, healthcare and pharmaceuticals, sustainable tourism, and 
nutrition. The role of the Commission is to: 
 
 “develop ways to better integrate private sector development objectives in support 
strategies, and … identify modalities for using the private sector as an implementing and 
financing partner in these areas” (p. 9).  
 
This includes the promotion of PPPs through support for legal and regulatory reform, 
financial instruments to leverage private funding for infrastructure projects, etc. , as well as 
the search for synergies with other aid instruments such as budget support (p. 15). Indeed: 
 
“Budget support, and the associated policy dialogue, can usefully underpin business 
environment reforms in partner countries by promoting the stability of macroeconomic 
frameworks, sound public financial management, transparency and oversight of the budget. 
Furthermore, specific reform contracts and results indicators focusing on private sector 
development can help achieve business environment reforms.” (p. 15) 
 
In a follow-up statement by the Council of the European Union (2014, p. 1) it was re-
affirmed that the role of the private sector needed strengthening for the implementation of 
the future SDGs, as the private sector was now understood to be key to deliver on the “new 
global partnership” of the post-2015 agenda (see above). To this purpose, the Council 
urged the Commission to enhance the interaction between the EU and Member States in 
the promotion of the strategic role attributed to the private sector in development. Vervynckt 
(2015) further draws attention to the role the EU played in placing private finance at the 
heart of the FFD3 negotiations seeking to promote greater roles for (European) 
Development Finance Institutions (which focus their activities on private companies and 
financial institutions) and to promote the use of “innovative” mechanisms of “development 
cooperation” such as PPPs and “blending”. 
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This shift towards the private turn in European development cooperation needs to be 
understood against the backdrop of the negative implications of the GFC for development 
assistance. In 2012, aid from the EU (and member countries) represented only 0.39 percent 
of EU’s GNI (down from 0. 44 percent in 2010), bringing this back to its lowest level since 
2007, when aid represented 0.37 percent of EU’s national income. In 2012, the EU 
countries delivered €50.6 billion in ODA, which represented a 4 percent drop as compared 
to the previous year.xxxiv  Aid has either been cut or has remained stagnant in 19 EU 
member states. The deepest cuts between 2011 and 2012 took place in Spain (49 percent), 
Italy (34 percent), Cyprus (26 percent), Greece (17 percent) and Belgium (11 percent) 
(CONCORD 2013, p. 5). CONCORD (2013, p. 8) adds that while most EU member states 
have confirmed their intention to honour the commitment to achieve the 0.7 percent 
ODA/GNI ratio, it remains unclear how they will achieve this. As already indicated earlier, 
while making less resources available for development cooperation, donors wish to make 
these resources work harder.  
 
 
4. Implementing the private turn: the European blending facilities 
 
In the context of the EU, a family of blending facilities have been set up since 2007 with the 
explicit aim to increase private participation in the delivery of development. The principle of 
the blending mechanism is to combine EU grants or concessional finance (from its budget 
or EDF programme) with loans or equity from public (non-concessional) or private 
financiers. The latter include loans by the international, regional and European bilateral 
financial institutions such as the European Investment Bank (EIB), European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), 
and public national DFIs (such as Nordic Investment Bank (NIB), Agence Française de 
Développement des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (AFD) and KfW Bankengruppe) (Ferrer and 
Behrens 2011).xxxv  The idea is that the EU grant element can be used strategically to attract 
additional financing  (from non-grant public assistance as well as private investment) for 
important investments in EU partner countries by reducing exposure to risk (Planas 
2012).xxxvi  Further, ODI (2011, p. 13) points to another guiding principle behind blending in 
the EU context, which is:  
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“to join forces (development expertise) and resources (development finance) between the 
European Commission (EC), the Member States and the development financiers following 
the spirit of division of labour and complementarity in order to fulfill partner countries 
development needs in the most efficient manner.”  
 
The grant aid is intended to leverage additional non-grant financing, generally for 
infrastructure, energy or private sector development projects, to meet unmet investment 
needs (Bilal and Kratke 2013). While partners in the beneficiary country can be public, 
private or mixed, public partners have until now constituted the majority of beneficiaries 
(ODI 2011, p. 22). Grants flows to public authorities can, however, be on-lent to the private 
sector, for instance, in the form of guarantees or subsidies for a particular PPP, while the 
“leveraged” flows from DFIs or the private sector serve to mobilize finance for the private 
participant in the provision of a particular service.xxxvii   
 
The EU grant contribution in its blending mechanisms takes different forms of support to 
investment projects, including:xxxviii   
 
• Investment grant & interest rate subsidy - reducing the initial investment and overall 
project cost for the partner country; 
• Technical assistance - ensuring the quality, efficiency and sustainability of the 
project; 
• Risk capital (i.e. equity & quasi-equity) - attracting additional financing; 
• Guarantees - unlocking financing for development by reducing risk. 
 
For the EU, the increased deployment of blending mechanisms in development cooperation 
is a relatively new phenomenon. The EDF Investment Facility, which is under EIB 
management (see above), is its first manifestation and was created in 2003. It has been 
succeeded by the creation of a series of Blending Facilities (see below).xxxix  Further, 
although the resources involved in blending remain small as compared to the EU’s overall 
ODA budget (at 4 percent of total ODA in 2012), they have increased significantly over the 
last few years (see Figure X below), and the Commission has indicated across various 
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documents that it seeks increasingly to organise its development cooperation around the 
principle of blending.  
 
Figure 3: Total ODA channelled through EC blending facilities since 2007(millions of €) 
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To support political priorities and to distract attention from diminishing aid budgets, donors 
are increasingly looking to private finance as a way of injecting private sector resources and 
expertise into development finance. According to the EC’s 2011 policy paper, Increasing the 
Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change,1 “the EC envisages channelling a 
higher percentage of EU development resources to be channelled through existing or new 
financial instruments”, known as ‘blending facilities’. 
According to an EC expert working group, blending facilities “combine market (or concessional) 
loans and other financial instruments with accompanying grant (or grant equivalent) 
components to gain leverage and thereby increase impact”. 2
Although the EC has been increasing the use of these instruments since 2007, it is only since 
2012 that there has been a substantial shift. A new EU platform for blending in external 
cooperation (the EU blending platform) was set up in December 2012 to facilitate the scaling up 
of these blended resources.  
This briefing aims to describe and analyse how blending facilities work at the EU level – 
particularly those facilities that are set up and managed by the EC – in order to identify the 
challenges and risks involved. It will also support civil society organisation (CSO) advocacy 
activities and campaigns towards EU institutions and multilateral and bilateral development 
finance institutions, which is particularly relevant in the context of the EU blending platform. 
The information included in this report comes from research papers, official documents and 
interviews with experts and officials. A summary of the methodology can be found in  
Appendix A. 
The briefing is structured as follows. The first section presents the political context in which 
blending mechanisms have emerged at the EU level and describes the facilities and mechanisms 
set up so far, including the EU blending platform. The second section describes and analyses 
the current portfolio of the EU regional blending facilities, including the sectors covered, the 
instruments used, the beneficiaries and the standards applied. The third section addresses the 
crucial issues of leverage and additionality, examining definitions and implications. The fourth 
section identifies the problems and challenges of the current blending mechanisms, while the 
final section summarises the findings and puts forward a number of recommendations.
7Introduction
Generally speaking, the term ‘blending’ 
refers to a mechanism that links a grant 
element, provided by ODA, with loans from 
publicly owned institutions or commercial 
lenders. While the grant element refers to 
a transfer made in cash, goods or services 
for which no repayment from the recipient 
country is required, the loan implies a 
repayment of principal and interest by the 
recipient. 
Blending grants and loans is not something 
new in Europe or around the world. 
Historically, this mechanism has mostly 
been used to subsidise loans to the public 
sector in developing countries from publicly 
owned institutions and development 
banks. For many years, multilateral and 
bilateral DFIs have blended their own loans 
for infrastructure and other development 
initiatives with grants. 
DFIs are publicly owned institutions that 
lend money, either at commercial rates 
or on concessional terms, to public or 
private sector borrowers in developing 
countries. In Europe, they include regional 
DFIs such as the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) and national DFIs, such as the 
German Development Bank (Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau – KfW) and the Agence 
Française de Développement (AFD). 
Government-backed export credit agencies 
(ECAs) have a long record of supporting 
commercial loans that have been blended 
with ODA grants, often in the context of tied 
aid programmes. At the international level, 
the World Bank has decades of experience 
blending donor funds with commercially 
raised loans through its low-income country 
lending arm, the International Development 
Association (IDA). 
Recently many DFIs, including some in 
Europe, have used blending mechanisms 
to increase their support and lending 
to private companies, and to partner 
with private financiers in funding these 
activities. At the European level, this 
includes using ever larger quantities of 
ODA. Since 1996, the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) – the World Bank’s private 
sector arm – has blended small amounts 
of donors’ concessional funds ($407 
million since 1996) w th the IFC’s own non-
concessi nal funding. However, i  2008 a 
blended finance unit was formally created 
to manage the concessional donor funds, 
which reflects an increasing support for this 
approach inside the IFC.3 
At the same time, a heavy focus on private 
sector blending is being vigorously pursued 
in EU member states such as the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Sweden. For 
example, the UK is the largest contributor, 
after the EC, to the EU-Africa Infrastructure 
Trust Fund – the longest-existing European 
blending facility for the developing world – 
and an important contributor to the Global 
SME Finance Facility set up in April 2012 
by the IFC.4 In Germany, since the 2009 
change of government, statements from the 
Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Dirk Niebel, and from the 
German Development Bank have highlighted 
that there is a strong interest in promoting 
blending mechanisms at both a national and 
European level.5 Sweden has increased ODA 
for private sector investments in developing 
countries and is promoting the use of 
blended finance as part of its innovative 
financing mechanisms, particularly to 
support the private sector, as well as through 
international development banks. 
At the EU level, ODA money ch nnelled 
through EC blending facilities has increased 
substantially in recent years, rising from 
€15 million in 2007 to €490 million in 
2012. Between 2010 and 2012, there was a 
near doubling of funds (see Figure 1). This 
represents an increase of blended ODA in 
relation to EU institutions’ ODA, from 0.2 per 
cent in 2007 to almost 4 per cent in 2012. 
Part 1 
Blending and the EU 
Source: EC database for the 
Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF), 
Neighbourhood Investment Facility 
(NIF), Latin America Investment 
Facility (LAIF), Investment Facility 
for Central Asia (IFCA) and Asian 
Investment Facility (AIF). For the 
Western Balkan Investment Framework 
(WBIF): WBIF’s public database 
was accessed in early July 2013. The 
Investment Facility for the Pacific (IFP) 
and the Caribbean Investment Facility 
(CIF) have not yet disbursed any funds.
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Figure 1 –Total ODA channelled through EC blending facilities since 2007
€ million
 
Source: Eurodad (2013, p. 7) 
 
Since 2007, the Commission has set up eight loan and grant blending facilities (highlighted 
in Table 1), covering almost all countries in the EU’s area of external cooperation. The 
facilities receive grant funding from the EDF, the EU budget and member states, and this is 
blended with loans from other financial institutions. The facilities have broad stated 
objectives such as (quoted in ODI 2011, p. 26): “Promoting equitable socio economic 
development and job creation through the support for small and medium size enterprise 
and the social sector”, and “To provide greater coherence and better coordination among 
the donors”. But ODI (2011) add that most Facilities also include “supporting EU linked 
businesses as a priority” which is in contradiction to the EU member states’ commitment on 
untied aid.   
 
EU facilities are comparatively modest in size, totalling around €2.2 billion in 2013, but 
would have “unlocked” multiples in project financing from development finance institutions, 
regional development banks, beneficiary countries and the private sector (see Planas 2012; 
Rudischhauser 2012).xl  
 
Table 3: EU regional blending facilities and grants commitments until 2013 
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Despite the fact that this still represents a 
small percentage of overall ODA, the EC’s 
focus on making blending mechanisms “a 
powerful tool to leverage private sector 
support” has drawn particular public 
attention, given that it means “a higher 
share of aid”6 and a likely significant 
increase in private sector blending. In short, 
blending could be seen as part of a potential 
sea change for development finance, which 
effectively shifts ODA from the public to the 
private sector, while at the same time helping 
to replace ODA with private finance.  
Political context and rationale
The EU’s blending agenda is supported 
by a narrative that focuses on bringing 
the private sector to the centre of its 
development strategies. However, it is also 
a convenient excuse for donors to give less 
ODA, and provides an opportunity for rich 
countries to channel finance to their own 
domestic companies. During a time when 
European public finances are under pressure, 
the idea of ‘financing more with less’ public 
money is an attractive political objective. 
As noted above, many EU governments 
have also placed the private sector at the 
centre of their development strategies. 
However, in reality blending mechanisms 
are also meant to ‘underpin EU external 
priorities’,7 which include enhancing the 
EU’s aid visibility and even supporting the 
activity of big EU corporations operating 
abroad. This controversial private sector turn 
in development finance, of which blending 
is just one expression, could be seen as a 
reaffirmation of the Washington Consensus 
in Europe, which implies the predominance 
of market-driven approaches.8 In some ways 
this may be true, as ODA would become 
increasingly tied to, and channelled through, 
private actors. However, blending also entails 
far larger public support and subsidies for 
private sector actors, and inevitably means 
selecting sectors and countries rather than 
letting the market decide. 
The EC has been driving the push for 
greater private sector blending, and has 
been supported by EU governments 
gathered together in the European 
Council. The EC’s Agenda for Change is a 
strategic document that is being reflected 
in all EU programmes, and puts forward 
a narrative in which “leveraging private 
sector activity and resources” is seen 
as key to delivering public goods. This 
approach was endorsed by the May 2012 
European Council Conclusions. Since then, 
numerous EC policy papers and public 
statements from EU officials have included 
explicit references and commitments in this 
regard. For instance, according to the EC 
communication on improving EU support to 
developing countries in mobilising financing 
for development, released in July 2012,9 “the 
EU should use its grants more strategically 
and effectively for leveraging public and 
private sector resources”, through regional 
blending mechanisms, “which are expected 
to be further scaled up in future in order to 
leverage grant resources”. These plans were 
also stressed in the 2013 EC Communication 
and EU Accountability Report on Financing 
for Development.10 
We can expect this concerted political 
push from the EC to result in a significant 
increase in ODA and member states (MS) 
contributions being devoted to private 
sector blending at the European level in 
the near future. The discussions on the EU 
Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020 
have represented a key opportunity to put in 
practice what was established in the Agenda 
for Change. Blending was presented by the 
EC as a key ‘new’ element, on which further 
efforts should be focused. In addition, the EC 
has also encouraged DFIs, including the EIB, 
to enhance their participation in blending 
mechanisms. In its proposal on the external 
lending mandate of the EIB for 2014–
2020, the EC states that “the EIB should 
endeavor further to enhance coordination 
and cooperation with European Financial 
Institutions and International Financial 
Institutions, notably those participating in 
the EU Platform for Blending in External 
Cooperation”.11 
However, the European Parliament (EP) 
and many CSOs have challenged the EC’s 
private sector blending agenda. An EP 
resolution12 adopted on 23 October 2012 
called on the EC “to provide clear information 
on how this [blending] mechanism serves 
the purpose of a development policy based 
on ODA criteria and how the power of 
scrutiny of Parliament will be exercised”. 
In its June 2013 resolution on financing for 
development, the EP echoed CSO concerns, 
calling “on the EU to properly evaluate the 
mechanism of blending loans and grants 
– particularly in terms of development and 
financial additionality, transparency and 
accountability, local ownership and debt 
risk – before continuing to develop blending 
loans and grants”.13 
Overview of EIB and EC blending 
facilities  
The ODA that is used for EU-level 
blending comes from a variety of sources, 
but principally from the European 
Development Fund (EDF) and the European 
Commission’s development budget. The 
EC’s development budget is part of the 
overall EC budget and hence is subject to 
approval and scrutiny by the EP and all 
the governments of the EU, through the 
Council. However, the EDF is a separate 
voluntary fund and member states can 
decide themselves how much to contribute 
to it. As such, it is subject to its own financial 
rules, which are different from those that 
The EU’s blending agenda is supported by a narrative that 
focuses on bringing the private sector to the centre of its 
development strategies.
“
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apply to the EU budget. This means that the 
EDF is controlled directly by the EC, with 
no parliamentary oversight, and hence it 
has far less accountability than the regular 
EC development budget. There has been 
mounting pressure from the EP to bring 
the EDF under its scrutiny by including it in 
the next multiannual financial framework 
(2014–2020) – the budget of the EU – but 
this decision has been delayed until 2020.14
At a European level, blended ODA is 
currently being channelled through 
facilities managed by either the EIB or the 
EC, and an internal evaluation suggests 
there is little coordination between the 
two. The EIB manages two blended funds 
(see table 1), and the EC manages eight (see 
Table 2). The mid-term evaluation review of 
the investment facility (IF) managed by the 
EIB concludes that “the Commission and the 
EIB generally operated on parallel tracks with 
few synergies despite the potential benefits 
of such synergies for enhancing development 
impact”.15 As the EC also implements 
programmes at national and regional level 
in African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries, this lack of coordination, which 
can create extra burdens for recipients and 
potentially lead to the duplication of efforts, 
is worrying.
EIB blended finance
The EIB manages an IF for blending that 
was launched in 2003 – with two separate 
windows. It is separate from the EIB’s 
own resources and is a revolving fund, 
meaning that if returns are generated 
they are used for further investment. One 
window is for African, Caribbean and Pacific 
States (ACP) countries, and the other for 
Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) of 
EU member states. The fund has a capital 
endowment from the EDF, which allows it to 
offer market-linked loans, equity funding and 
guarantees, and also has a grant envelope 
from the EDF to be used for technical 
assistance and interest rate subsidies, as 
shown in Table 1. 
As the mid-term evaluation of the IF 
has stressed,16 the IF has to respond to 
market opportunities, which all too often 
implies a problematic trade-off between 
developmental objectives and the 
requirement of financial viability. As the 
revolving fund is separate from the EIB’s own 
budget, it is free to make riskier investments 
and set its pricing accordingly. However, if it 
loses money overall it will shrink, meaning the 
financial viability of projects is of paramount 
importance. 
The political agreements guiding IF 
investments focus on poverty reduction, 
sustainable development, and the 
integration of these countries into the 
world economy. These are interpreted by 
the EIB as a mandate to support the private 
sector. Cooperation agreements guiding EIB 
operations in ACP countries and OCTs are 
the Cotonou Agreement17 and the Overseas 
Association Decision, respectively. These are 
centred on poverty reduction and ultimately 
its eradication; sustainable development; and 
progressive integration of the ACP and OCT 
economies into the world economy. In this 
context, the IF is set up to promote private 
sector development and is specifically tasked 
with supporting the ACP financial sector 
and “to seek and channel funds through 
ACP national and regional institutions and 
programmes that promote development for 
small and medium-sized enterprises”.18 
Financial intermediaries (FIs) have been 
increasingly selected by the EIB as the 
vehicle to reach small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), raising concerns 
At a European level, blended ODA is currently being channelled 
through facilities managed by either the European Investment 
Bank or the EC, and an internal evaluation suggests there is little 
coordination between the two. 
“
Table 1 – EIB Investment Facility and own resources for ACP countries and OCTs 
 Instrument Grant envelope Capital endowment under EDF
Investment Facility for Africa 
Caribbean and Pacific countries
10th EDF: €400m (2008-13) 9th and 10th EDF: €3,137m  
(2003-13)
Investment Facility for Overseas 
Countries and Territories
10th EDF: €1.5m (2008-13) 9th and 10th EDF: €48.5m 
(2003-13)
Source: Annual report on EIB activity in Africa, Caribbean and Pacific, and the overseas territories (2012).
Table 2 – EU regional blending facilities and grants commitments until 2013
Instrument facility 
and launching 
year
Region covered Allocation and sources of grant funds (in €m)
From 10th 
EDF 
From EU 
Budget*
From MS Other TOTAL
EU-Africa 
Infrastructure Trust 
Fund – ITF (2007)
47 African countries 308.7 329
ear-
marked 
for SE4All
84 
(as of 
30 Sept. 
2012)
0 721.7
Neighbourhood 
Investment Facility 
– NIF (2008)
Countries eligible 
for European  
Neighbourhood 
and Partnership 
Instrument
0 767 72 
(as of 
31 Dec. 
2012)
839
Western Balkan 
Investment 
Framework – WBIF 
(2009)
Western Balkan 
countries
0 196 
(2008-
2012)
EIB: 10, 
EBRD: 10, 
CEDB: 10
19 Donors: 
84.95 (as 
of 31 Dec. 
2012)
310.95
Latin America 
Investment Facility 
– LAIF (2010)
Latin American 
countries
0 192 0 0 192
Investment Facility 
for Central Asia – 
IFCA (2010)
Central Asia 
countries
0 65 0 0 65
Asia Investment 
Facility – AIF (2011) 
Asian countries 0 30 0 0 30
Investment Facility 
for the Pacific – IFP 
(2012)
Pacific countries 10 0 0 0 10
Caribbean 
Investment Facility 
– CIF
(2012)
Caribbean countries 40 0 0 0 40
TOTAL 358.7 1,579 156 114.95 2,208.65
(*) EU budget figures correspond to the period 2007-2013, unless otherwise stated.
 
Source: Eurodad (2013) 
 
The grants have mainly been deployed for infrastructure investment, with transport and 
energy dominating (followed by water and sanitation). Some facilities also seek to promote 
access to finance for MSMEs. And, while partners in the beneficiary countries can be 
public, private or mixed institutions, public partners have dominated the first years of the 
Facilities, with only 11 percent of the grant contributions disbursed through the Facilities 
going directly to private sector beneficiaries (ODI 2011; Eurodad 2013, p. 19). However, in 
2012, the number of projects granted to private sector partners through the Facilities 
doubled as compared to 2011 and the European Commission plans a strong increase in 
this area (Eurodad 2013, p. 11; Rudischhauer 2012). The EU blending platform, which was 
set up in 2012, for instance, has indicated an interest in pursuing how the private sector can 
be involved more in the blending mechanisms, either as financier or as beneficiary. Indeed, 
the Deputy Director of DEVCO-EuropeAid clarifed (Rudisschauer 2012): xli  
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“Despite the emphasis so far on public investments, the Facilities do provide the means to 
catalyse also private investments. The regulatory framework of the Facilities allows using 
grants as innovative financial tools such as risk capital and investment guarantees. So far 
grant support of this type has been used to support Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises 
(MSME), primarily to provide access to finance. One approach is to use the grant element 
as a first-loss tranche in a structured fund and thus leverage the amount of resources that is 
available to achieve developmental objectives. … The European Commission is currently 
working to extend the use of innovative financial tools such as risk capital and investment 
guarantees with a view of unlocking additional private investments in other sectors, such as 
infrastructure. Blending could address several factors that currently hold back private 
investment into projects with a strong developmental impact.”  
 
For the European Commission (2014b, p. 16) blending is an important vehicle to leverage 
additional resources for development as well as increase the impact of EU aid. The 
Commission further seeks to extend the scope of blending into new areas including the 
social sectors and agriculture. 
 
5. Deploying official development finance to promote the private financing of 
development: an appraisal 
 
It has by now been sufficiently well established that the private turn in development 
cooperation in essence is about the declining willingness of Northern donors to fund 
development publically. This has combined with an imperative to deploy public funds to 
support the expansion of private capital in the developing world. The financing gap 
argument that has recurred across development cooperation statements for the last few 
years is a good illustration of the logic that prevails. The argument proceeds as follows. A 
particular financing need to attain the SDGs is identified. This is compared to the current 
public financing of development and the shortfall is understood as the rationale for the 
promotion of an expanded role for private capital in financing development (rather than that 
the public financing of development is strengthened). As already indicated above, this 
corresponds to a mass of wealth circulating in financial markets that is seeking “stable” 
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investment outlets (see OECD 2014), together with an unwillingness to tackle illicit financial 
flows. It is indeed striking that while the FFD3 outcome document on the financing 
framework to implement the next set of development goals celebrated the private sector 
(see above), it failed to move the discussions (or actions) forward on the need for a global 
tax body. The latter has nevertheless been a recurring request from the developing 
countries, which are excluded from the OECD, which currently remains the only body in 
which international issues bearing on tax regulation are dealt with.  
 
One sector that has been particularly affected by the private turn is infrastructure. The 
figures below give an indication of the fast expansion of private sector participation in 
infrastructure.  They also indicate how this trend has been particularly strong in the energy, 
telecommunications and transport sectors (with water and sewerage accounting for a 
smaller share).  
Figure 4: Private sector participation in infrastructure, 1985-2013 (billions of current US $) 
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Source:  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2015, p. 161)  
 
We have illustrated above the rhetoric as well as the policy in practice attached to the 
private turn, but what about its scholarship?xlii What analytical arguments are deployed to 
support the strong bias in favour of private sector interventions in fields that were 
traditionally understood to require direct state intervention (such as typically infrastructure 
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provision)? It seems that while the Washington Consensus was attached to a notion of 
perfect working markets (except in the case of readily identifiable market failures such as 
the existence of externalities, large sunk costs (natural monopolies) or public goods) and 
the post-Washington Consensus broadened the scope of market failures, positing a 
paradigm of imperfect working markets, there is currently no clearly identifiable set of 
analytical proposition which can account for the prevailing preference for private sector 
provision in sectors traditionally calling for extensive state intervention.xliii   The superiority of 
the private sector over public service provisioning seems to have acquired canonical status, 
with reiterations of alleged efficiency benefits or risk-absorption capacities ringing rather 
hollow in the context of a large and growing body of ambiguous (or negative) evidence on 
private sector involvement in the provision of basic needs and services, not to mention its 
detrimental prospects for social objectives (see below). The mantra of superior performance 
of the private sector has combined with arguments of scarcity of resources to finance public 
investment, against a backdrop of plenty of private wealth. So, rather than devise better 
taxation coordination policies internationally to enable public mobilisation of resources for 
investment, the logic turns to the private mass of wealth as a resource for development. But 
as development is a risky enterprise, the public sector needs to enable the private sector’s 
appetite for it. This necessitates both indirect interventions through changes in the 
investment climate favouring private investment and direct interventions through subsidies, 
guarantees, and various other risk-mitigation instruments.  
  
While the current analytical arguments underpinning the great push for private sector 
involvement in areas traditionally occupied by the state, remain sparse (in favour of re-
iterations of poorly substantiated alleged strengths of the private sector), a strong set of 
critical analytical observations bearing on the increased prevalence of private capital (and 
finance) in certain spheres of economic and social life has become prevalent. This includes 
the critical commentary on the financialisation of infrastructure that has drawn attention to a 
set of issues. These can be summarised as follows.  
  
First, by turning infrastructure into an “asset class” infrastructure provisioning becomes 
driven by the need to generate competitive returns for private investors (O’Neill 2013; Hebb 
and Sharma 2014). This implies that the infrastructure service needs to generate revenue 
streams, which often translates into fees or tariffs conditioning access. Fine and Hall (2012, 
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p. 58) observe how the public good becomes “subordinate to the imperative of designing a 
commercially viable contract”. Infrastructure’s non-commercial outcomes or purposes 
become marginalised, with access now regulated by capacity to pay and multiple purposes 
that could be attached to infrastructure are reduced to guaranteeing profitability for 
investors.  Such “multiple purposes” could include: enforcing standards in service delivery 
and in employment; skills development of workforce; development of auxiliary 
services/activities; the exploitation of economies of scope; development of new technology 
to accommodate externalities – including those bearing on climate change; alternative use 
of physical assets to serve the public good, etc.  Furthermore, the reliance on private 
investment in infrastructure (and hence the need to generate revenue streams) will dictate 
the location and design of the projects to attract private investment, where the public sector 
loses the capacity to cross-subsidise infrastructure investments that present less attractive 
commercial features (see also Hebb and Sharma 2014).  
 
Second, the need to create “bankable” projects has led to substantial efforts and resources 
to assist countries to develop capacity to rearrange their infrastructure needs into 
investment opportunities, often described as creating “an enabling” environment. The G20 
(2013, pp. 2-3) observes how:  
 
“non-financial factors are at the core of creating an attractive investment climate … For 
infrastructure investment in particular, the key challenge is to draw capital to sound 
investments by improving the investment climate and expanding the pipeline of bankable 
projects through sound planning and quality design. All countries can act in this space by 
putting in place the governance, regulatory and institutional frameworks that enhance the 
willingness of private investors to provide long term financing for investment, including in 
infrastructure”  
 
The OECD (2014a, p. 35) notes that, while often investors will depend on public financial 
support through such mechanisms for instance as guarantees on funding or viability gap 
funding or subsidies, investors’ main concerns often bear on the nature of the regulatory 
environment (and possible changes therein). A survey of major players in infrastructure 
projects indicated that “robust rule of law and attractiveness of the regulatory environment 
together with a successful track record of other infrastructure projects closed” are most 
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cited as elements driving choice of jurisdiction to invest in infrastructure. Investors shun 
regulatory and administrative law uncertainty. They want “clear returns” and “predictable 
cash-flows”.xliv The OECD (2014a, p. 36) continues: “Investors require a regulatory regime 
that is able to outlive government or a political majority”! And again, in conclusion (p. 41) 
the Report highlights that it is (our emphasis):   
 
“a frequent misconception that the private sector must be incentivised to participate in 
infrastructure by providing financial support by the public sector in the form of grants, tax 
reliefs, co-investment, and the provision of guarantees. … Most important factors are a 
clear institutional framework, transparent bidding and awarding procedure, a robust rule of 
law and the absence of interference… Incidentally, higher public intervention with financial 
support typically triggers a higher probability of political interference in project management 
and of contract renegotiation, something that private investors are not comfortable with”.  
 
An example is provided by the failure of the Ontario provincial government to reverse 
through court action increases in tolls charged on the Toronto 407 toll road, the lease of 
which is held by a consortium of Spanish, Canadian and Australian engineers and investors 
for 99 years (see Torrance 2009). This example is just one among a host of attempts by 
governments to renegotiate terms and conditions agreed under previous administrations 
(see Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge 2015). Often, as was the case for this example, a 
“good regulatory environment” requires the possibility to fix number of users, prices, time 
horizons, etc in contracts for entire periods spanning sometimes between 30 to 99 years. In 
the case of the Toronto 407 toll road, an incoming government had tried to roll back 
increases in tolls that where inscribed in the contract agreed under a previous 
administration. However, the contract “withstood the political challenge and the increases in 
tolls based on the contractual mechanism will be maintained for the duration of the contract” 
(Torrance 2009, p. 93). As a result of the sanctity of such contractual provisions, 
infrastructure is removed from the sphere of the democratic process that could seek to 
determine its use, the conditions governing its access, the conditions under which it is 
produced, etc.xlv Streeck (2013, p. 15) refers to this type of institutional change as being 
“fostered by creditors’ preferences – with the purpose of creating a commitment of states to 
honour commercial before political debt”. 
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Third, with the increased prevalence of private financial involvement in infrastructure the 
state assumes a set of new roles. Rather than intervening directly through the provision of 
infrastructure, the state’s role becomes redefined in terms of its capacity to create assets 
and manage private sector risks (see). For Farmer (2014) the state becomes “tasked with 
responsibilities that protect the rate of return of the global infrastructure investment fund”.  
 
Fourth, these are general considerations that derive from the introduction of the logic of 
private capital (and finance) into the infrastructure delivery mechanism. The way these 
translate in practice in a concrete setting will depend on a host of other factors, including 
institutional arrangements, organisation of the labour force, organisation of user groups 
etc., where the outcomes of private sector involvement in infrastructure will emerge as a 
result of a host of complex and often conflictual relations bearing on infrastructure provision 
and consumption.xlvi   
 
Fifth, ultimately, the fiscal burden of provision of basic goods and services remains with the 
state. This is obvious for a PPP arrangement where the ultimate cost of the project remains 
born by the taxpayer (or the user of the service). PPP revenue has to come from dedicated 
state funding or from end users or from a combination of these. While governments may 
defer payment for infrastructure investment when embarking on a PPP, they will ultimately 
carry the full cost of the project. Yet, the original absence in government accounts of the 
increase in expenditures or debt has been a potent driver of political preference for PPPs 
as a method to upgrade infrastructure networks. While PPPs do not bring money for free, or 
not necessarily at lower cost (see below), they change the timing of payment for 
infrastructure. With a PPP or a concession contract, payments are translated into a unitary 
charge by the private sector, which incorporates all costs (costs of construction, 
maintenance, debt finance etc) into a regular payment over a period of decades. Effectively, 
payment is delayed.  PPP costs are spread evenly over the whole life of the contract as the 
unitary charge is made. This is in contrast with conventional procurement where costs are 
concentrated in the early years rather than being spread over time. PPPs allow to create 
the illusion of fiscal probity in the short-term and arguments have recurred in favour of new 
accounting techniques that would bring PPP payments onto government books as liabilities 
to avoid projects being financed through PPPs for short-term fiscal (and long-term illusory) 
reasons (see IMF 2004; Bailey 2013).xlvii  Funke, Irwin, and Rial 2013, p. 9) insist: 
 
 
35 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800 
 
“If the use of a PPP instead of public financing does not change the net present value of the 
government’s cash flows, the PPP does not make investment more affordable. If the 
government cannot afford to finance the project using traditional public finance, it probably 
cannot afford to undertake it as a PPP. Conversely, if the government can afford to 
undertake the project as a PPP, it can probably also afford to finance it traditionally”. 
 
Sixth, the cost of private provisioning of public goods and services tends to exceed public 
financing for a set of reasons. Private financing costs are typically higher than government-
funded infrastructure. It is more expensive for the private sector than for the government to 
raise finance. Further, private investors have profitability expectations. A report of experts 
on financing the sustainable development goals produced for the UN General Assembly 
notes that United Nations (2014, paragraph 138): “private investors often demand upward 
of 20-25 percent annual returns on ‘bankable projects’ in developing countries. These costs 
need to be offset by efficiency gains or other benefits to make their use attractive”. Also, 
PPPs have been characterised by a “25 to 35 percent failure rate of PPPs in developed 
countries, due to delays, costs overruns and other factors, even higher failures in 
developing countries”. When projects results in losses, the private sector withdraws leading 
to a termination of project unless the public sector steps in to increase payments to the 
private investor or reclaim responsibility for the infrastructure project. Alexandersson and 
Hulten (2009, p. 14) observe that “private sector partners rarely find themselves locked-in, 
while this is a common outcome for the public partner”.xlviii  PPPs moreover imply large deal 
and consultancy fees, incurred by the various participants in the deal. Engel, Fischer, and 
Galetovic (2010, p. 17) cite evidence that costs incurred for legal, technical and financial 
advice can reach 10 percent of the total cost of the project. And, finally, governments often 
offer guarantees and various forms of subsidies to PPP investors, as was illustrated in the 
example of the Senegalese toll road above.xlix In its latest evaluation of PPPs, the World 
Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (2014, p. 6) higlights how:  
 
“The assessment of public sector liabilities triggered by a PPP project is … of utmost 
importance. These can amount to substantial direct liabilities for example, up front viability 
gap funding to make projects more commercially viable and the referred usage payment or 
contingent liabilities such as guarantees on particular risk variable, for example, to buffer 
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the traffic demand risk for the private party, compensation payments for uninsurable force 
majeure or termination payments”. 
 
The IMF (2004) has also warned that governments could be overpricing risk and 
overcompensating the private sector for taking on this risk “which would raise the cost of 
PPPs relative to direct public investment” (IMF 2004, p. 14). In a more recent report, the 
IMF (2015, p. 30) reiterates that PPPs are “generally considered to carry higher fiscal risks 
than budget financing”.  And, in a report for the European Parliament, Griffiths et al. (2014) 
propose the following comparison of financing costs of alternative mechanisms for 
infrastructure projects (see Figure 5). PPPs clearly emerge as the most expensive way to 
finance projects, with these liabilities or costs ultimately carried by the state.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such an indictment of the financial costs (and concomitant fiscal burdens) attached to PPPs 
places a strong burden on the efficiency gains that PPP financing would need to effect to 
compensate for the cost disadvantage. As was summed up a decade ago in an IMF (2004, 
p. 14) report: “much of the case for PPPs rests on the relative efficiency of the private 
sector”.  A more recent report by the IMF offers a most feeble response IMF (2015, p. 11): 
“Evidence of whether PPPs can provide infrastructure more efficiently than traditional 
procurement is mixed”. This joins the World Bank’s own recent assessment which finds that 
indicators for efficiency were mixed (Independent Evaluation Group 2014, p. 72).  
 
Figure 5: Financing costs as a percentage of net amount provided (low-
income countries) 
 
Griffiths et al. (2014, p. 30) 
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There are extensive assessments that have been critical of the efficiency impact of the PPP 
experience (see, e.g., Shaoul, Stafford, and Stapleton 2012; Alexandersson and Hulten 
2009; Perkins 2013; Funke et al. 2013; Hall 2014; Hildyard 2012; Vining and Boardman 
2008); Jupe 2009 ). Evidence presented by Calderón and Servén (2010, p. 37) indicates 
that private participation delivered some benefits in terms of efficiency and quality but that 
these were limited due to weak regulatory frameworks and “poorly-designed concession 
and privatisation agreements which led to ubiquitous renegotiations and ended up costing 
governments enormous sums.” Empirical assessments also face methodological 
challenges, in particular with regard to the counterfactual. One systematic review of the 
literature on PPPs and development makes a strong, and negative, evaluation case, by 
pointing out that (IOB 2013, p. 44):l  
 
“Many early studies regarding PPP performance are based on experiences in Western 
countries and are strongly linked to privatization programs in the 1990’s. Evaluation designs 
used for these studies have most often been weak, and the data mostly flawed. It is 
therefore little wonder that evaluations thus far clearly point to contradictory assessments of 
their performance (Hodge & Grave, 2011). Despite growing interest in PPPs, the evidence 
base on results is still sparse and successful partnerships have been elusive”. 
 
The review continues, p. 45:  
 
“One of the most striking outcomes of the systematic review is that the evidence on PPP 
performance is still rather sparse. Robust empirical analyses regarding the net effect of 
PPPs (including both before-and-after analysis and compared to a counterfactual of either 
public or private program execution) are virtually absent”. 
 
And again, p. 28:  
 
“Most case studies present a positive effect of the PPP on output … but the evidence is 
weak and limited. The majority of studies has no counterfactual” (emphasis added). 
 
Further, although supporters suggest that PPPs are efficient, the mechanisms by which this 
should be achieved are unclear (see also above). The IMF (2004) suggests that efficiency 
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gains are derived from competition but, the Report admits, this effect tends to be limited as 
the markets in which PPPs operate are less contestable. PPPs usually operate in areas 
with significant social impact and involve large sunk costs.li Perkins (2013, p. 8) insists that 
innovation in PPPs can sometimes achieve major cost savings resulting from “radical 
redesign of projects and changes in construction techniques”. However, he cautions that, 
while large costs savings could be made through innovation, the scope for this in reality can 
be small in part because of the contractual process which requires the need for contracts to 
be tightly specified at the start (p. 32): 
 
“PPPs can save construction costs and enable the design of projects to deliver the services 
required at lowest cost if contracts avoid over-specifying projects. When project guidance is 
sufficiently flexible, PPPs can stimulate innovation in both project design and execution. 
Projects can sometimes be downsized compared to what government initially plans without 
sacrificing capacity or service quality, resulting sometimes in cost-savings running to billions 
of dollars (Ugarte, Gutierrez, and Philips 2012). These are the grounds most commonly 
advanced for financing transport projects under PPP contracts. A majority of PPPs projects 
are, however, specified in ways that severely limit this scope for achieving efficiencies”.  
 
In sum, while the involvement of the private sector implies a complex web of public 
(financial and non-financial) support for such involvement, it remains unclear what the 
public or collective benefits are from increasingly complex mechanisms of public-private 
interactions. The private sector tends to carry little risks (financial or/and operational) for the 
rewards it reaps. Actionaid, Eurodad, and Oxfam (2014, p. 1) draw attention to the 
implications this has for the deployment of public development assistance to promote 
private sector involvement in developing countries: “Lack of transparency around aid to the 
private sector, and particularly around the building and leveraging strategies makes it hard 
to evaluate the amount of money given to the private sector and its impact”.  Bilal and 
Kratke (2013) also highlight that the rationale for increasing the role of the private sector in 
development should be to make a contribution to poverty eradication and achieve 
sustainable development rather than to help private firms make a profit.  
 
Indeed, in the specific context of the deployment of development assistance to leverage 
private flows a set of additional issues enter the frame. First, the issue of additionality has 
 
 
39 
 
This project has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme 
for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no 266800 
attracted a lot of attention. The main concern with additionality is whether the publicly 
backed resources are necessary to make private investment happen (as they would 
otherwise crowd or displace private resources and as such distort ‘optimal’ allocations of 
private finance), and whether the development impact of privately financed projects is 
enhanced as a result of the blending mechanism. The former is referred to as financial 
additionality while development additionality captures the latter effect (UKAN 2015, p. 4). 
UKAN (2015) reviews the existing literature that assesses the additionality of ODA in 
leveraging private investment. It delivers a negative assessment in that it finds very little 
evidence about the financial or developmental additionality of leveraging private 
investments. Further, it highlights that there are no shared or common methodologies 
across donor agencies to measure additionality. Moreover, the Report highlights that 
research points to the difficulty in aligning leveraging of private investment with aid 
effectiveness principles (see also Griffiths 2015). Eurodad (2013, p. 13) adds that while 
poverty reduction and sustainable development are often part of the objectives of EU 
blending facilities, “not all institutions involved in the existing blending facilities have a 
common and agreed development mandate”.lii Against this backdrop, the European 
Parliament has passed a resolution (in June 2013)liii calling for better evaluations of the 
mechanism of blending loans and grants – “particularly in terms of development and 
financial additionality, transparency and accountability, local ownership and debt risk – 
before continuing to develop blending loans and grants” (Griffiths et al. 2014; see also 
Vervynckt 2014; Eurodad 2013; Concord 2013; Martin 2015).liv Second, this raises issues 
of accountability and transparency. Eurodad (2013, p. 16) has criticised the low levels of 
information publicly available on the leveraging activities going on in the EU, both through 
the EC’s own facilities and member states’ DFOs. The report observes that: “[i]t is not 
possible to do a proper portfolio analysis of the projects supported by blended ODA, as the 
EC does not track or evaluate the commercial loans that ODA grants are blended with, nor 
estimate the extent to which the grants proved essential to attracting the loan”. The lack of 
transparency may imply that common channels of oversight such as e.g. through 
parliamentary scrutiny, fail to operate in the absence of adequate information.  
 
Third, the OECD (2015, p. 32) has highlighted the danger of blurring the lines between the 
activities of export credit agencies and DFIs “when bilateral DFIs mainly support their 
domestic enterprises with credits and guarantees” through various blending arrangements. 
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When blending operations involve large multinational companies of EU member states (as 
was the case in the example provided above), the issue of tied aid also looms large. Fourth, 
the issue of ownership to which donors are officially committed is particularly fraught in the 
context of the blending facilities. The process through which projects get selected and 
pursued originates with the EU DFIs, where the selection process proceeds on the basis of 
financial criteria (European Court of Auditors 2014, p. 9) rather than that the project pipeline 
is designed in collaboration with partner governments and informed by their own national 
development plans. This also means that financial criteria prevail over social objectives in 
the design and implementation of the provision of core public services such as 
infrastructure facilities. We may want to recall that when development cooperation targeted 
such interventions this traditionally proceeded through grants or concessional loans which 
allow for the incorporation of a broader set of criteria when designing a system of 
infrastructure provisioning. Crucial is the possibility for the deployment of social objectives 
to ensure access and equity in the use of the specific infrastructure facility. Yet, the 
increased involvement of DFIs has significant qualitative implications, both for ownership 
and governance issues bearing on the role of infrastructure or other public services (see 
also Eurodad 2013). Eurodad (2013) has also raised concerns that the mechanisms for civil 
society participation or consultation during the implementation of the projects are often ad 
hoc if possibly non-existent. The same lack of institutional mechanisms applies in the 
context of complaints of (and redress for) communities affected by a large project financed 
through a blending facility.  
 
Finally, while blending may be part of a more differentiated approach to development 
cooperation, which would allow to concentrate ODA in LICs and perhaps use blended 
facilities in MICs, currently, blending facilities straddle all developing countries, i.e. they are 
not targeted to a particular income group. Further, it is not clear whether, if blending 
facilities would be focused on MICs, public resources (provided through the facilities) are 
needed to draw in private capital (for large infrastructure projects). Do these projects need a 
public subsidy or could the limited public resources not be put to better use (see also 
Eurodad 2015)? 
 
6. Conclusion 
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Since the early 2000s, we have seen a particular reorientation of development cooperation, 
in the service of the fast expansion of private capital flows to developing countries. The role 
of ODA has become redefined to enable the expansion of private (and often foreign) capital 
in economic spheres where previously public provision dominated. This includes various 
forms of economic and social infrastructure, including transport, water, energy, education 
and health. This trend reflects both the declining willingness to finance development 
cooperation publically as well as the fast and vast accumulation of private wealth worldwide 
looking for investment opportunities. The increased involvement of private finance in 
infrastructure provision has pervasive implications for governance, access, equity, etc.  At 
the same time, the efficiency arguments, upon which the preference for private sector 
involvement in infrastructure is predominantly built, have failed to materialise (if they exist in 
theory), allowing more costly arrangements to take shape with pernicious social (and long-
term fiscal) implications. There is an urgent need for the advocacy and promotion of private 
flows to finance development to become better informed by the existing evidence base 
across a set of criteria, including cost, efficiency, social impact, etc. This would hopefully 
allow for a re-orientation of the current deployment of publicly-backed resources in the 
services of private financing of development (back) towards support for raising public 
investment levels. The latter are the backbone of more the general investment increases 
that remain highly necessary across vast groups of developing countries.  
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                                                i	  Note	  that	  using	  the	  term	  “development	  finance”	  becomes	  increasingly	  tenuous	  as	  official	  development	  cooperation	  is	  put	  in	  the	  service	  of	  mobilising	  private	  financial	  flows.	  	  ii	  Capital	  account	  liberalisation	  was	  often	  undertaken	  as	  a	  result	  of	  obligations	  arising	  out	  of	  WTO	  negotiations	  on	  trade	  in	  financial	  services,	  or	  resulted	  from	  commitments	  in	  trade	  agreements	  and	  bilateral	  investment	  treaties	  (in	  particular	  with	  the	  US	  and	  the	  EU)	  (see	  Akyuz	  2014,	  p.	  5).	  Capital	  account	  liberalisation	  was	  often	  also	  implicitly	  part	  of	  World	  Bank-­‐imposed	  conditionalities.	  Akyuz	  (2014)	  adds	  that	  certain	  countries	  choose	  unilaterally	  to	  liberalise	  their	  capital	  accounts	  seeking	  to	  close	  structural	  current	  account	  deficits	  and	  hoping	  this	  would	  produce	  accelerations	  of	  investment	  and	  growth.	  	  iii	  http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/overview/monterrey-­‐conference.html	  iv	  http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/doha/	  v	  See	  Bayliss	  and	  Hall	  (2001)	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  critique.	  	  vi	  The	  World	  Bank	  consists	  of	  public	  sector	  and	  private	  sector	  affiliates.	  The	  public	  sector	  affiliates	  are	  the	  IBRD	  and	  the	  IDA,	  which	  lend	  to	  the	  public	  sector	  on	  either	  concessional	  (IDA)	  or	  non-­‐concessional	  terms.	  The	  World	  Bank	  Group’s	  private	  sector	  affiliates,	  the	  International	  Finance	  Cooperation	  (IFC)	  and	  the	  Multilateral	  Investment	  Guarantee	  Agency	  (MIGA)	  engage	  directly	  with	  the	  private	  sector.	  	  vii	  http://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/global-­‐Infrastructure-­‐facility	  viii	  World	  Bank	  and	  IMF	  (2012,	  p.	  2):	  “The	  institution	  now	  facilitates	  private	  sector	  development	  through	  nearly	  all	  of	  its	  areas	  of	  engagement	  –	  directly	  through	  the	  investment	  and	  advisory	  services	  of	  IFC	  and	  the	  guarantees	  of	  MIGA,	  and,	  increasingly,	  through	  the	  enabling	  environment	  for	  the	  private	  sector	  supported	  by	  World	  Bank	  operations	  and	  technical	  assistance”,	  see	  Diagram	  2	  “Conceptual	  overview	  of	  how	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group	  leverages	  and	  supports	  the	  private	  sector”.	  See	  also:	  “Update	  on	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  Business	  Modernization:	  Results,	  Openness,	  and	  Accountability”,	  Background	  Paper	  for	  the	  Development	  Committee	  Meeting,	  April	  2012”.	  	  ix	  The	  World	  Bank	  website	  further	  highlights	  the	  ambition	  to	  deploy	  the	  IDA,	  the	  Bank’s	  concessional	  public	  sector	  arm	  which	  focuses	  on	  low-­‐income	  countries,	  to	  exploit	  synergies	  between	  the	  different	  affiliates	  of	  the	  Bank	  and	  as	  such	  leverage	  and	  maximise	  the	  complementarities	  between	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  (http://www.worldbank.org/ida/ida_psd.html):	  	  	   “IDA	  is	  working	  to	  optimize	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group’s	  “4	  for	  1”	  value	  proposition—that	  is,	  tap	  the	  combined	  strengths	  and	  comparative	  advantages	  of	  IDA,	  the	  International	  Bank	  for	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  (IBRD),	  the	  International	  Finance	  Corporation	  (IFC)	  and	  the	  Multilateral	  Investment	  Guarantee	  Agency	  (MIGA)—to	  enable	  IDA	  countries	  to	  have	  better	  access	  to	  a	  comprehensive	  package	  of	  support”.	  	  x	  PRG	  is	  a	  Partial	  Risk	  Guarantee,	  which	  provides	  a	  guarantee	  for	  lenders	  to	  private	  investment	  projects	  against	  debt	  service	  defaults	  that	  result	  from	  the	  non-­‐performance	  of	  government	  obligations.	  PCG	  is	  Partial	  Credit	  Guarantee,	  which	  covers	  all	  events	  of	  non-­‐payment	  for	  a	  specified	  part	  of	  any	  financing.	  	  xi	  Various	  definitions	  of	  “leveraging”	  abound.	  UKAN	  (2015,	  p.	  17)	  formally	  defines	  it	  as	  “the	  use	  of	  public	  finance	  and	  risk	  mitigation	  instruments	  to	  remove	  the	  barriers	  to	  private	  sector	  investment	  in	  developing	  countries	  and	  thereby	  mobilse	  significant	  amounts	  of	  private	  capital	  for	  development”.	  See	  also	  ODI	  (2011),	  Griffiths	  (2012)	  and	  Martin	  (2015)	  for	  discussions	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  “leveraging”	  or	  “blending”	  in	  donor	  discourse	  and	  of	  how	  it	  relates	  to	  ODA.	  xii	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  in	  the	  context	  of	  this	  re-­‐orientation	  of	  Official	  Development	  Assistance,	  proposals	  have	  been	  put	  forward	  to	  introduce	  a	  measure	  called	  “Total	  Official	  Support	  for	  Sustainable	  Development”	  (TOSSD)	  to	  complement	  ODA	  as	  a	  broader	  statistical	  aggregate	  “of	  international	  public	  contributions	  to	  development”.	  The	  aim	  is	  for	  this	  broader	  measure	  to	  provide	  a	  “comprehensive	  account	  of	  finance	  made	  available	  thanks	  to	  the	  official	  sector”	  (see	  OECD	  2014b).	  DAC	  (2015)	  puts	  forward	  a	  set	  of	  methodologies	  to	  report	  on	  amounts	  mobilised	  from	  the	  private	  sector	  through	  a	  set	  of	  official	  development	  finance	  instruments	  including	  syndicated	  loans,	  guarantees	  and	  share	  in	  collective	  investment	  vehicles.	  	  xiii	  See	  Griffiths	  (2012)	  and	  above	  on	  the	  practice	  of	  leveraging	  through	  synergies	  across	  the	  affiliates	  of	  the	  World	  Bank	  Group;	  see	  also	  Ferrer	  and	  Behrens	  (2011,	  p.	  4)	  who	  point	  to	  the	  long	  tradition	  of	  blending	  in	  bilateral	  (France,	  Germany)	  and	  multilateral	  development	  banks’	  cooperation.	  xiv	  See	  http://www.worldbank.org/mdgs/post2015.html	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  specific	  instruments	  through	  which	  “blending”	  of	  (multilateral)	  development	  finance	  can	  proceed.	  See	  also	  Table	  1	  of	  United	  Nations	  (2014).	  xv	  http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/ffd3/	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                                                                                                                                                              xvi	  https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300	  xvii	  See	  http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/thehighlevelforaonaideffectivenessahistory.htm	  xviii	  See	  http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/49650173.pdf,	  paragraph	  32	  xix	  In	  2013,	  USD	  34	  billion	  was	  provided	  by	  “development	  partners”	  to	  support	  the	  “enabling	  environment”,	  within	  infrastructure	  sectors	  and	  beyond	  for	  the	  general	  investment	  climate	  (OECD	  2015,	  p.	  5).	  Such	  an	  “enabling”	  environment	  includes	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  specific	  sectors	  (such	  as	  infrastructure)	  reflecting	  the	  idea	  that	  this	  will	  promote	  cost-­‐recovery	  mechanisms	  which	  are	  instrumental	  for	  private	  sector	  expansion,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  facilitation	  of	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  into	  a	  particular	  country	  (see	  OECD	  2015,	  p.	  22	  for	  an	  example).	  xx	  Output-­‐based	  aid	  provides	  grant-­‐subsidies,	  which	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  compliance	  with	  the	  delivery	  of	  public	  services	  by	  private	  operators	  to	  poor	  people.	  The	  grant	  often	  serves	  to	  complement	  or	  substitute	  for	  user	  contributions	  (fees).	  	  xxi	  See	  for	  instance	  World	  Bank	  and	  IMF	  (2012,	  p.	  6	  Diagram	  3)	  for	  a	  map	  of	  the	  full	  spectrum	  of	  World	  Bank	  Group	  Support	  to	  PPPs,	  as	  an	  ideal	  conduit	  for	  forging	  the	  public-­‐private	  links,	  from	  its	  upstream	  knowledge	  agenda	  down	  to	  the	  financing	  of	  individual	  transactions.	  	  xxii	  See	  also	  http://www.edfi.be/.	  EDFI	  is	  the	  Association	  of	  European	  Development	  Finance	  Institutions.	  	  xxiii	  The	  FMO,	  the	  Netherlands	  Development	  Finance	  Company,	  for	  instance	  offers	  “a	  full	  range	  of	  financial	  instruments	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  private	  companies	  and	  financial	  institutions	  in	  developing	  economies.	  To	  meet	  the	  needs	  of	  individual	  projects,	  a	  mix	  of	  funding	  can	  be	  provided	  including	  loans	  (such	  as	  syndicated	  loans),	  equity,	  mezzanine,	  guarantees	  and	  capital	  markets”	  (http://www.edfi.be/members/7-­‐netherlands-­‐development-­‐finance-­‐company-­‐.html).	  The	  CDC,	  the	  UK’s	  DFI,	  “invests	  in	  viable	  private	  businesses	  in	  poorer	  developing	  countries	  to	  contribute	  to	  economic	  growth	  that	  benefits	  the	  poor”	  (Kingombe	  et	  al.	  2011,	  p.	  vi).	  See	  also	  IFC	  (2011,	  Annex)	  for	  a	  description	  of	  the	  profiles	  of	  IFIs	  with	  important	  private	  sector	  operations.	  	  xxiv	  See	  OECD	  (2015)	  for	  an	  overview	  of	  the	  various	  instruments	  that	  have	  been	  used	  by	  bilateral	  and	  multilateral	  donors	  in	  support	  of	  private	  financing	  of	  infrastructure.	  xxv	  Own	  resources	  of	  the	  EC	  include:	  agricultural	  duties	  and	  sugar	  levies;	  customs	  duties	  and	  a	  uniform	  percentage	  rate	  to	  the	  VAT	  base	  of	  each	  member	  state	  (around	  0.5	  percent)	  (Gavas	  2010).	  The	  EU	  budgetary	  aid	  allocation	  is	  determined	  through	  the	  7-­‐year	  Multi-­‐Annual	  Financing	  Framework	  (MFF),	  which	  was	  approved	  by	  the	  European	  Parliament	  in	  December	  2013	  for	  the	  next	  7-­‐year	  period	  (2014-­‐2020)	  and	  amounts	  to	  €51.4	  billion	  (European	  Commission	  2014,	  p.	  6).	  xxvi	  The	  EDF	  is	  the	  EU's	  main	  instrument	  for	  providing	  development	  aid	  to	  African,	  Caribbean	  and	  Pacific	  (ACP)	  countries	  and	  to	  Overseas	  Countries	  and	  Territories	  (OCTs).	  It	  is	  financed	  by	  direct	  contributions	  from	  EU	  member	  countries	  and	  covered	  by	  its	  own	  financial	  rules.	  The	  total	  resources	  of	  the	  11th	  EDF	  amounts	  to	  €30.5	  
billion	  for	  the	  period	  2014-­‐2020.There	  is	  an	  on-­‐going	  debate	  on	  bringing	  the	  EDF	  funds	  within	  the	  MFF	  framework,	  but	  a	  decision	  on	  this	  issue	  has	  been	  postponed	  until	  2020.	  Given	  that	  the	  EDF	  relies	  on	  voluntary	  contributions	  by	  member	  states	  and	  does	  not	  draw	  on	  the	  general	  EU	  budget,	  it	  is	  controlled	  directly	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  and	  not	  subject	  to	  parliamentary	  oversight.	  Eurodad	  (2013,	  p.	  9)	  argues	  that	  it	  hence	  has	  less	  accountability	  than	  the	  regular	  EC	  development	  budget.	  	  xxvii	  Between	  2003	  and	  2013,	  the	  Facility	  has	  invested	  €3.4	  billion,	  85	  percent	  of	  which	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  ACP	  and	  OCT,	  and	  the	  financial	  sector	  has	  been	  the	  largest	  single	  beneficiary	  of	  these	  investment	  (followed	  by	  the	  energy	  sector	  –	  electricity	  and	  coal)	  (European	  Commission	  2013b,	  p.	  61).	  Its	  investments	  take	  the	  form	  either	  of	  risk-­‐bearing	  (non-­‐guaranteed)	  loans	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  or	  interest-­‐rate	  subsidies.	  The	  Facility	  has	  been	  designed	  as	  a	  renewable	  fund,	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  deploying	  loan	  repayments	  for	  reinvestment	  in	  other	  operations	  (ibid.).	  xxviii	  In	  2012,	  43	  percent	  of	  the	  Facility’s	  lending	  went	  to	  support	  for	  the	  financial	  sector	  in	  ACP	  countries.	  These	  financial	  intermediaries	  are	  meant	  to	  act	  as	  brokers	  between	  the	  public	  institution	  and	  the	  private	  company	  benefitting	  from	  public	  lending	  and	  investments	  (Eurodad	  2013,	  p.	  10).	  The	  intermediaries	  include	  commercial	  banks,	  microfinance	  institutions	  and	  private	  equity	  funds.	  Eurodad	  (2013)	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  concerns	  within	  CSOs	  regarding	  whether	  intended	  beneficiaries	  are	  actually	  reached	  and	  whether	  the	  Facility	  is	  an	  appropriate	  tool	  to	  provide	  access	  to	  finance	  for	  SMEs.	  	  	  
xxix http://www.efcanet.org/Portals/EFCA/EFCA%20files/PDF/28-06-07InformationExternalMandates.pdf xxx	  The	  Consensus	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  Code	  of	  Conduct	  on	  Complementarity	  and	  Division	  of	  Labour	  two	  years	  later.	  	  
xxxi Eurodad (2013, p. 4) offers a more cynical assessment where the EU’s blending agenda is seen as a “convenient 
excuse for donors to give less ODA, and it provides an opportunity for rich countries to support their own domestic 
companies”.  
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                                                                                                                                                              xxxii	  Eurodad	  (2013,	  p.	  11)	  adds	  that	  under	  this	  new	  approach,	  only	  seven	  countries	  in	  Latin	  America	  would	  continue	  receiving	  EU	  country-­‐level	  cooperation,	  while	  all	  countries	  in	  the	  region	  would	  be	  eligible	  for	  regional	  blending	  programmes	  such	  as	  the	  Latin	  America	  Investment	  Facility.	  xxxiii	  See	  http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=2852	  xxxiv	  Note	  that	  although	  the	  EU	  states	  decreased	  their	  aid	  expenditure	  during	  the	  crisis,	  the	  EU	  institutions’	  ODA	  which	  is	  partially	  funded	  from	  resources	  independent	  of	  member	  states’	  contributions	  increased	  between	  2011	  and	  2012	  (Laskarides	  2015,	  p.	  13;	  and	  see	  below).	  	  xxxv	  ODI	  (2011,	  p.	  21)	  clarify	  that	  “As	  a	  general	  rule,	  all	  European	  development	  finance	  institutions	  are	  eligible	  to	  participate	  in	  blending	  facilities.	  Non-­‐EU	  development	  banks,	  notably	  regional	  development	  banks	  and	  the	  World	  Bank,	  can	  co-­‐finance	  projects	  already	  supported	  by	  the	  European	  DFIs	  and	  blending	  facilities.	  However,	  development	  finance	  institutions	  like	  PROPARCO	  and	  FMO,	  which	  focus	  solely	  on	  the	  private	  sector,	  can	  only	  participate	  alongside	  a	  European	  DFI.	  Beneficiary	  governments	  provide	  substantial	  co-­‐	  financing	  but	  the	  position	  on	  non-­‐EU	  private	  financing	  is	  unclear.”	  
xxxvi  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/innovative-financial-instruments-blending_en xxxvii	  See	  the	  example	  of	  the	  Dakar-­‐Diamniadio	  toll	  road	  above	  for	  an	  illustration.	  
xxxviii  https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/innovative-financial-instruments-blending_en 
Eurodad (2013, p. 17) however observes that although a wide range of possible types of grant instruments can be used by 
EU blending facilities, currently three common instruments dominate EU blending practices. These include: direct 
investment grants; technical assistance and interest rate subsidies. Together these accounted for 93 percent of total 
amount of grants approved by May 2013. See also Planas (2012).  xxxix	  As	  indicated	  above	  the	  Investment	  Facility	  is	  a	  revolving	  fund	  with	  a	  capital	  endowment	  from	  the	  EDF.	  It	  makes	  market-­‐linked	  loans,	  takes	  equity	  position,	  provides	  guarantees,	  provides	  interest	  rates	  subsidies	  and	  technical	  assistance.	  	  xl	  http://ecdpm.org/great-­‐insights/private-­‐sector-­‐for-­‐development/engaging-­‐private-­‐sector-­‐development-­‐role-­‐eu-­‐regional-­‐blending-­‐facilities/	  xli	  http://ecdpm.org/great-­‐insights/private-­‐sector-­‐for-­‐development/engaging-­‐private-­‐sector-­‐development-­‐role-­‐eu-­‐regional-­‐blending-­‐facilities/	  xlii	  See	  Fine	  (2012)	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  separating	  these	  three	  dimensions	  when	  trying	  to	  understand	  the	  evolving	  nature	  of	  neoliberalism.	  	  xliii	  See	  Van	  Waeyenberge	  (2006)	  on	  the	  shifting	  analytical	  foundations	  underlying	  the	  Washington	  and	  post	  Washington	  Consensus,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  fraught	  and	  limited	  conceptualisations	  of	  state	  intervention	  they	  give	  rise	  to.	  	  xliv	  See:	  http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/infrastructure/making_the_most_of_a_wealth_of_infrastructure_finance	  xlv	  Hebb	  and	  Sharma	  (2014)	  also	  note	  for	  the	  case	  of	  American	  cities,	  where	  private	  investment	  in	  infrastructure	  is	  a	  relatively	  new	  phenomenon,	  that	  while	  previously	  such	  investment	  was	  carried	  out	  by	  public	  entities	  and	  financed	  through	  tax-­‐free	  municipal	  bonds,	  the	  use	  of	  new	  financial	  products	  to	  enable	  private	  investment	  in	  infrastructure	  lacks	  the	  transparency	  that	  characterises	  the	  municipal	  bond	  market.	  xlvi	  See	  various	  FESSUD	  deliverables,	  including	  Bayliss,	  Fine,	  and	  Robertson	  (2013),	  for	  an	  illustration	  of	  how	  the	  system-­‐of-­‐provision	  approach	  can	  provide	  a	  useful	  organising	  framework	  to	  engage	  with	  such	  concrete	  mediations	  of	  private	  capital	  involvement	  in	  infrastructure	  delivery	  across	  sector	  and	  country-­‐specific	  settings.	  xlvii	  See	  also	  Burger	  and	  Hawkesworth	  (2013)	  for	  an	  account	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  different	  budgeting	  systems	  on	  the	  costing	  (and	  choice)	  between	  traditional	  infrastructure	  procurement	  and	  PPPs.	  	  
xlviii A similar sentiment was echoed by Kaushik Basu, then World Bank Chief Economist, in conversation with Duncan 
Green from Oxfam in March 2015: “The way PPPs are done worries me a lot. These are two very different creatures 
being brought together in a single cage and one can just gobble up the other. The private sector is often much smarter at 
writing the contracts, so the taxpayer carries the can when bankruptcy occurs”, http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/what-to-do-
about-inequality-shrinking-wages-and-the-perils-of-ppps-a-conversation-with-kaushik-basu-world-bank-chief-
economist/#prettyPhoto accessed 14th March 2015. xlix	  See	  Bayliss	  and	  Van	  Waeyenberge	  (2015)	  for	  an	  elaborate	  discussion.	  	  
l In a review of Canadian PPPs, Vining and Boardman (2008) find only half of the PPPs reviewed to be successful. Jupe 
(2009) viewed PPPs as an “imperfect solution” for transport in the UK. See also Shaoul et al. (2012) for a very strong 
critique of PPPs in transport in the UK. li	  See	  Helm	  (2010)	  for	  a	  summary	  of	  the	  traditional	  arguments	  on	  market	  failures	  in	  infrastructure.	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                                                                                                                                                              lii	  Eurodad	  (2013,	  p.	  13)	  provides	  the	  examples	  of	  the	  Italian	  Società	  per	  le	  Impresse	  all	  Estero	  (SIMEST)	  which	  is	  dedicated	  formally	  to	  the	  promotion	  of	  “foreign	  investment	  by	  Italian	  companies	  and	  the	  provision	  of	  technical	  and	  financial	  support	  in	  support	  of	  investment	  projects”.	  	  liii	  This	  followed	  an	  earlier	  resolution	  (23	  October	  2012)	  that	  called	  on	  the	  Commission	  to	  “provide	  clear	  information	  on	  how	  [the	  blending]	  mechanism	  serves	  the	  purpose	  of	  a	  development	  policy	  based	  on	  ODA	  criteria	  and	  how	  the	  power	  of	  scrutiny	  of	  Parliament	  will	  be	  exercised”	  (Eurodad	  2013,	  p.	  8).	  	  liv	  Concord	  (2013b,	  p.	  5)	  in	  its	  analysis	  of	  EDF11	  insists	  that	  “the	  EC	  has	  not	  proposed	  any	  clear	  objectives,	  principles,	  criteria	  and	  guidelines	  so	  far	  to	  ensure	  that	  this	  funding	  modality	  will	  truly	  contribute	  to	  	  sustainable	  and	  inclusive	  development	  and	  the	  	  eradication	  	  of	  	  poverty	  	  in	  	  ACP	  	  countries.”	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Annex 1: International Finance Institutions with Private Sector Operations 
 iv International Finance Institutions and Development Through the Private Sector
Box 1: International Finance Institutions with Private Sector Operations
Examples of Multilateral Development Banks or Finance Institutions 
with Private Sector Operations
t "GSJDBO%FWFMPQNFOU#BOL	"G%#

t "TJBO%FWFMPQNFOU#BOL	"%#

t #MBDL4FB5SBEFBOE%FWFMPQNFOU#BOL	#45%#

t %FWFMPQNFOU#BOLPG-BUJO"NFSJDB	$"'

t &VSPQFBO#BOLGPS3FDPOTUSVDUJPOBOE%FWFMPQNFOU	&#3%

t &VSPQFBO*OWFTUNFOU#BOL	&*#

t *OUFS"NFSJDBO%FWFMPQNFOU#BOL	*%#

t *OUFS"NFSJDBO*OWFTUNFOU$PSQPSBUJPO	**$

t *OUFSOBUJPOBM'JOBODF$PSQPSBUJPO	*'$

t *TMBNJD$PSQPSBUJPOGPS%FWFMPQNFOUPGUIF1SJWBUF4FDUPS	*$%

t.VMUJMBUFSBM*OWFTUNFOU'VOE	.*'

t.VMUJMBUFSBM*OWFTUNFOU(VBSBOUFF"HFODZ	.*("

t /PSEJD*OWFTUNFOU#BOL	/*#

t 01&$'VOEGPS*OUFSOBUJPOBM%FWFMPQNFOU	0'*%

Examples of Bilateral Private Sector Development Finance Institutions
t #FMHJBO$PSQPSBUJPOGPS*OUFSOBUJPOBM*OWFTUNFOU	4#*#.*

t #FMHJBO*OWFTUNFOU$PNQBOZGPS%FWFMPQJOH$PVOUSJFT	#*0

t $%$(SPVQ	#SJUJTI%FWFMPQNFOU'JOBODF*OTUJUVUJPO

t $0'*%&4	4QBOJTI%FWFMPQNFOU'JOBODF*OTUJUVUJPO

t %BOJTI*OEVTUSJBMJ[BUJPO'VOEGPS%FWFMPQJOH$PVOUSJFT	*'6

t %&(	(FSNBO%FWFMPQNFOU'JOBODF*OTUJUVUJPO

t %FWFMPQNFOU#BOLPG"VTUSJB	0F&#

t &OUSFQSFOFVSJBM%FWFMPQNFOU#BOLPGUIF/FUIFSMBOET	'.0

t 'JOOJTI'VOEGPS*OEVTUSJBM$PPQFSBUJPO	'JOOGVOE

t 'SFODI*OWFTUNFOUBOE1SPNPUJPOT$PNQBOZGPS&DPOPNJD$PPQFSBUJPO	1SPQBSDP

t +BQBO#BOLGPS*OUFSOBUJPOBM$PPQFSBUJPO	+#*$

t /PSXFHJBO*OWFTUNFOU'VOEGPS%FWFMPQJOH$PVOUSJFT	/PSGVOE

t 0WFSTFBT1SJWBUF*OWFTUNFOU$PSQPSBUJPO	01*$64

t 4*.&45	*UBMJBO%FWFMPQNFOU'JOBODF*OTUJUVUJPO

t 40'*%	1PSUVHVFTF%FWFMPQNFOU'JOBODF*OTUJUVUJPO

t 4XFEGVOE
t 4XJTT*OWFTUNFOU'VOEGPS&NFSHJOH.BSLFUT	SIFEM)
 
Source: IFC (2011) 
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